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 Sendero Luminoso first appeared in Peru in May 1980 by burning several ballot boxes 
and hanging dogs from streetlights.  This unusual event sigaled the beginning of one of the 
most violent insurgencies in the Western hemisphere.  Abimael Guzmán, the founder of Sendero 
Luminoso, set out to utterly destroy Peruvian society in order to replace it with his vision of a 
utopian communist society by creating a peasant uprising starting in the Andean highlands and 
spreading throughout Peru, eventually surrounding the capital, Lima.     
 The government of Peru virtually ignored Sendero Luminoso f r two years, which 
allowed the group to establish strong base areas in and around the department of Ayacucho.  
When the government finally reacted, it was forced to declar  a state of emergency in the south 
central highlands and send in the military to regain control.   
 Through successive administrations over the next decade, Peru was engulfed in violence 
and destruction, human rights abuses, corruption, and economic catastrophe.  Sendero Luminoso 
demonstrated an uncanny ability to avoid the military’s concentrated efforts while expanding 
into new regions of Peru.  The group also benefited from the drug trade to finance the insurgency 
by providing protection to coca farmers and narcotraffickers in the Upper Huallaga Valley.   
Only after Guzmán’s capture in 1992 did the government witness visible progress in the 
fight against the insurgents.  Sendero Luminoso rapidly declined without Guzmán’s leadership 
and the remnants withdrew to the Upper Huallaga Valley.  Yet many of the conditions that led to 
the creation of Sendero Luminoso still plague the country, including corruption in the 
government, poverty, and a weak economy.  The missing catalyst is another leader like Abimael 
Guzmán.   
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path, was one of the most successful insurgent groups in 
the Western Hemisphere in the late 20th century.  What is most remarkable about the group’s 
expansion was that it occurred at a time when most Marxist-based institutions were collapsing.  
Equally remarkable was its popularity, given its philosophy of creating a utopian society through 
the violent destruction of all societal institutions.  The group managed to mobilize the Andean 
peasants with promises of a better life.  Successive administration failures also contributed to 
Sendero’s resiliency.         
According to current U.S. Army doctrine, there are three basic prerequisites to the 
emergence of an insurgency:  (1) a vulnerable population that hopes for change, (2) leadership, 
and (3) lack of government control.1  All of these conditions existed in Peru and enabled Sendero 
Luminoso to make headway.  For long-term endurance, an insurgency must be able to create 
popular support and maintain unity of effort.  Sendero Luminoso certainly demonstrated a will to 
resist, as witnessed by the fact that, despite aggressive counterguerrilla operations, it survives to 
this day.  Sendero had effective leadership, it was disciplined, and it developed a highly effective 
intelligence network as well as a propaganda machine.  Its reach extended throughout Peru and it 
eventually established networks in other countries, including the United States.   
An insurgency, of course, must have a favorable environment.  Approximately the size of 
Alaska, Peru is a struggling nation of 22 million people, with a great disparity in the standards of 
living and distribution of wealth.  The country is divided into three major regions: the Costa, 
Sierra, and Montaña.  The Costa, or coastal region, is the most developed and contains Peru’s 
five largest cities, including Lima, as well as the bulk of the nation’s industries and its most 
                                                 





extensive agricultural areas.  The majority of the business and landowners in the Costa are of 
Spanish origin, middle-class, and consider themselves white.   This region offers the greater 
opportunity for employment and advancement; however, historically jobs have gone to those of 
Spanish descent, marginalizing the people from the Sierra and Montaña regions.  The Sierra is a 
mountainous region covering roughly a quarter of the territory and half the population of Peru.  
Peruvian Indians, who trace their roots to the Incans, inhabit this area and live at poverty levels.  
They speak primarily Quechua, which further alienates them from the Spanish-speaking people 
of the Costa region.  This area has little arable land and what land is under cultivation is stony 
and windswept.  The only trafficable roads wind along the valley floors and are little more than 
dirt trails; there are no main roads from the coast.2  Due to the prohibitive mountain terrain and 
lack of access, the Sierra region historically received little government attention.  The Montaña 
region consists of the Amazon River basin and takes up two-thirds of the land of Peru, but is 
sparsely populated, mostly by tribal Indians.  Many believe this region contains rich oil reserves, 
but remains undeveloped because of the lack of access to the dense jungle.  The poor economic 
conditions, especially in the Sierra region, favored insurgency.   
Insurgencies develop through several phases.3  In Phase I, the insurgency is latent and 
incipient.  Its organizers conduct selected acts of terrorism, such as attacks on police forces, 
assassination of local government officials, and sabotage infrastructure.  They may also conduct 
discreet tactical operations to increase influence in the area and, perhaps more importantly, to 
acquire arms and ammunition.   
 Phase II is guerrilla warfare.  As the insurgent group gains strength and numbers, it 
openly challenges the local police and small military units in order to establish control over areas 
of the country.  The insurgents then set up their own government over these areas to demonstrate 
                                                 
2 Daniel Masterson, Militarism and Politics in Latin America: Peru from Sancho Cerro to Sendero Luminoso, p. 76. 




to the populace that they alone can provide the services the State failed to provide.  The goal of 
this phase is to expand control over other areas and people, in order to mobilize additional 
support through public service and propaganda.  If this fails to generate support, however, the 
insurgents will resort to coercion and terrorism.  The nature of the guerrilla actions and terrorist 
strikes against the military often provoke an equally violent reaction, or overreaction, from the 
government forces.  The guerrilla acts in the hope that the military will overreact against the 
general population, causing larger numbers of people to support the insurgency.  Each guerrilla 
success, no matter how minor, followed up with effective propaganda, provides psychological 
support to the insurgency and demoralizes the government forces.  As the government dedicates 
greater effort to the military aspects of counterguerrilla operations, fewer resources are available 
for development projects, which hinder its ability to reverse the conditions that caused the 
insurgency.    
 Phase III insurgency, also called a war of movement, is conventional warfare.  
This phase occurs when larger insurgent units conduct combat operations against government 
forces to capture and retain key objectives.  Sendero Luminoso only briefly achieved phase three.  
Although it engaged in large-unit attacks on government forces, it never was able to retain its 
objectives for more than twenty-four hours and never was able to sustain the momentum to 
continue to fight determined government forces. 
What are the strengths and weaknesses of guerrilla forces?  One of the strengths typically 
is intelligence collection.  Virtually every person is a potential spy or informer for the insurgents 
in their areas of operation.  Another asset is the fact that the rebels are native to the region.  They 
therefore know the traditions and speak the language of the local populace, making them very 
hard to distinguish from the average citizen.  This characteristic becomes even more important 




strengths.   Guerrilla tactics are another advantage because of the ease of planning and execution 
and difficulty in preventing.  Elusiveness, surprise, and brief violent action characterize such 
tactics, which can be further divided into terrorism and harassment.  Some examples of terrorism 
include bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, threats, mutilations, murder, torture, or 
blackmail.  Insurgents generally use terrorism for coercion, provocation, and intimidation.  
Examples of harassment include ambushes, raids, and other small-scale attacks dispersed in 
geography and time which give the perception that the guerrilla can strike anywhere.  Finally, 
physical conditioning is an asset and was so especially in the case of Sendero, which operated in 
the Sierra, an environment that imposed enormous physical hardships on government troops.   
Insurgent movements also have several weaknesses, the primary being limited personnel 
and resources.  Numerically small at first, a guerrilla band must rely on early tactical successes, 
supplemented by intense propaganda, to attract recruits.  The insurgents must also balance the 
need to recruit new members against security concerns of being penetrated by government 
agents.  Guerrilla forces typically start out with few weapons and little access to money and must 
acquire additional resources through operations or contributions from the local populace or even 
foreign governments.  The insurgents are also limited in their ability to reach mass segments of 
the population, especially in areas without modern infrastructure and internet access.   
Sendero Luminoso exploited the poor economic conditions to convince the most 
negatively affected and vulnerable population, the Indian population of the Sierra, to pick up 
arms and fight against the government.  Sendero leaders patiently recruited these people by 
capitalizing on government neglect while providing hope of a better life.  The group progressed 
through the phases of development and started with simple acts of protest, such as painting 
slogans on government structures, escalated to terrorism, and eventually resorted to large scale 




insurgency and allowed it to expand to the Costa region, which eventually necessitated a 
comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign. 
Counterinsurgency describes the full range of measures used by a government to protect 
its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.4  It comprises the actions taken by a 
nation to promote growth by building viable institutions (political, military, economic, and 
social) that respond to the needs of the people and has three targets:  the population, the 
insurgents, and external actors.  The government of Peru initiated a limited counterinsurgency 
campaign beginning in 1983, focused mainly on the military aspects or counterguerrilla 
operations.  Although the focus was on military operations against the insurgents, it also enacted 
various political, economic and social changes.   
Essentially, the State must take various actions to change the conditions that fuel the 
insurgency.  Most importantly, the government must focus on improving the lives of the 
population.  It may also use diplomacy – negotiation with the insurgents.  State-sponsored 
amnesty programs are an example of this.  The government may resort to restrictions on civil 
liberties in order to deny the insurgents the freedom to operate.  While this method is the most 
effective, it can also have adverse consequences and undermine the legitimacy of the current 
administration.  The more restrictions the State can impose without causing more people to rebel, 
the quicker it can defeat the insurgency.  The regime may also target and destroy the insurgent 
leadership.  This technique is effective in a leader-centric organization, but usually only in the 
short-term as new leaders step forward to fill the vacuum created by the loss.  Finally, 
counterguerrilla operations focus on the active military element of the insurgent movement only.  
Counterguerrilla operations, such as those launched by the Peruvian military in 1983-84, are a 
supporting component of counterinsurgency.          
                                                 




 In order to restore order, the government must target insurgents.  It must isolate them 
from the general population, both physically and psychologically, by employing a strategy based 
on balanced development, mobilization, and neutralization.  The military contributes to this 
effort by conducting six major operations:  intelligence-gathering, psychological operations, civil 
affairs, population and resources control, advisory assistance, and tactical or counterguerrilla 
operations.   
 The commander plans counterguerrilla operations to exploit the guerrillas’ weaknesses 
and prevent them from exploiting the government’s vulnerabilities.  Interdiction of the 
insurgents’ logistics support is one crucial task, but the commander must also protect his own 
lines of communication and infrastructure, such as power stations and water treatment plants.  
Finally, he sends out combat patrols to collect actionable intelligence, or information that leads 
to operations that cripple the insurgent organization.  Local paramilitary or militia often perform 
many of these tasks and, along with the police, are chiefly responsible for community defense.  
These organizations emphasize physical security and securing the lines of communication. The 
Peruvian government employed such groups, who were known as Rondas Campesinos. 
 Sendero Luminoso is a self-described Maoist organization that professes to advance the 
principles Mao Zedong introduced in China.  According to Mao, during any revolution, guerrilla 
operations offer the greatest likelihood of success in an underdeveloped nation.  Sendero adopted 
this tenet by continuously forwarding the call to the “People’s War” and focusing on armed 
strikes.  A guerrilla force must have powerful political leaders who “work unceasingly to bring 
about internal unification.  Such leaders must work with the people.”5  The insurgents must 
                                                 





balance operations against the enemy with actions supporting the people.  Sendero typically 
rejected or attacked all who did not adhere to Guzmán’s interpretation of Mao.   
 Mao also stated that the guerrillas must be sympathetic to the needs of the masses.  They 
derive their existence and support from the people and must attempt to meet the needs of the 
people or the insurgency will fail.  The insurgent leaders must be well trained, self-confident, 
able to establish severe discipline, and able to cope with counter-propaganda.  These leaders 
must be role models for the people. 
 The rebel force must develop a bond with the community.  This takes place by first 
arousing the people through propaganda and unifying them through political indoctrination.  This 
bond allows the insurgents to establish bases, or geographic areas that openly support the 
insurgency.  Within the base areas, the leaders then begin to arm the guerrillas.  Over time, the 
guerrilla force obtains more sophisticated weapons within the base area by defeating the 
government forces, which in turn allows it to expand this base.  Through this cycle of base 
expansion and bonding with the communities, the rebels are able to gain strength throughout the 
nation as the government forces’ strength declines.  This rebel-communal bond also allows the 
insurgents to regain territory lost to the State during the course of the struggle.   
 Mao provided several ‘rules’ and ‘remarks’ that outlined guerrilla behavior toward the 
local populace.  These guidelines delineated the means of establishing and maintaining bonds 
with the local communities.  The Viet Cong adhered to Mao’s rules and enjoyed great early 
acceptance and support among the people of Vietnam and serve as an example for Sendero to 
follow.  Mao’s three rules were: 
1. All actions subject to command.  This means that each individual, cell, or detachment 





2. Do not steal from the people. 
3. Be neither selfish nor unjust.6       
Mao placed great importance on being proper ‘guests’ of the locals when occupying their 
homes and villages to rest, feed, and heal the guerrilla army.  He also advocated the following 8 
instructions to ensure the guerrilla was a proper guest: 
1. Replace the door when you leave the house. 
2. Rollup bedding on which you have slept. 
3. Be courteous. 
4. Be honest in your transactions. 
5. Return what you borrow. 
6. Replace what you break. 
7. Do not bathe in the presence of women. 
8. Do not search those you arrest without authority.7  
Sendero initially lived by these principles and this made it extremely popular with the 
local population.  However, as the government forces moved into territory formerly controlled 
by the insurgents and began to gain support, Sendero resorted more to coercion and terror to 
maintain control. 
Unlike Sendero, Mao openly recruited and accepted former enemies into his guerrilla 
force, believing they provided valuable intelligence.  Similarly to Sendero, he believed that any 
new member must undergo political training and indoctrination prior to participation in any 
operations.  Only by making sure that new individuals were truly committed, could they be 
trusted.  This principle made government penetration of Sendero almost impossible. 
  
                                                 





Mao believed that unorganized guerrilla warfare cannot contribute to victory and  
those who attack the enemy using a combination of banditry and anarchism do not understand 
the nature of guerrilla action.  Guerrillas are to exterminate small forces of the enemy, to harass 
and weaken large units, and to attack enemy lines of communication, all to compel the enemy to 
disperse his strength.  “We must make war everywhere and cause dispersal of his forces and 
dissipation of his strength.”8  During the progress of hostilities, guerrillas gradually develop into 
conventional forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the guerrilla army.  Mao’s 
principles of guerrilla tactics can be summarized as follows: 
  -Enemy advances, we retreat 
  -Enemy halts, we harass 
  -Enemy tires, we attack 
  -Enemy retreats, we pursue.9 
 By adhering to Mao’s philosophy of guerrilla warfare, Sendero Luminoso capitalized on 
the existing environment and convinced the population of the Sierra to organize and revolt 
against the government.  These people were prime candidates to support this peasant-based 
revolution as years of government neglect or half-measures elevated their frustration.  Despite 
the government’s success in quelling previous insurgent groups, the people of the central 
highlands were desperate for change and willing to resort to violence to improve their future.  
  
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
9 U.S. Army, Counterguerrilla Operations, p. 2-10. 
 
CHAPTER 2 FORMATION (1968-1980) 
 Several factors contributed to the emergence of Sendero Luminoso, including dismal 
economic conditions, marginally effective government, and people eager for change.  Several 
governments attempted to address these concerns throughout the 1960s and 1970s.  The military 
was at the forefront of these efforts when it took over control of Peru through a series of coups, 
mainly to prevent what it perceived as middle-class elitist organizations from assuming power.  
With the government experiencing such turbulence, Marxist-based organizations were able to 
take root, both among the urban working class and rural peasantry.  Several Marxist leaders 
appeared during this time, but none more committed to violent overthrow than the leader of 
Sendero Luminoso, Abimael Guzmán.  He used the education system in the highlands to spread 
his beliefs of the need for violent revolution and organized the peasants for war. 
 
Latin America was a particularly turbulent region in the early 1960s.  Many of the 
countries were experiencing some form of political turmoil ranging from protests and strikes to 
revolution.  Most of the striking workers were aligned with Marxist groups or left-wing labor 
unions, adding to fears of Communist revolution.  This political turmoil, as well as economic 
trouble, led to military coups in many Latin American countries in order to restore order or 
prevent Communist takeovers.  President Fernando Belaúnde Terry of the Popular Action Party 
(PAP) struggled with those same problems in Peru in the 1960s.  Economic problems imposed 
extreme hardship on the peasants, most of who worked on large haciendas for low wages and 
meager rations.  As a result, unrest spread throughout the country, challenging Belaúnde and his 
administration to maintain order.  At the same time, insurgents from several Cuban-style foco 
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guerrilla movements were attacking isolated military and police posts in the countryside.1  By 
1966, Belaúnde found himself forced to send in the military to crush the guerrilla movements 
and contain the peasants, establishing a precedent of violent military action.2 
 The Peruvian military had never been one to show restraint.  Since 1914, the military had 
demonstrated a willingness to intervene in political matters.3  In 1962, military leaders took over 
in a coup after the election of President Victor Raul Haya de la Torre of the American Popular 
Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), which they violently opposed, as a result of several clashes 
with ‘Apristas’ dating back to 1930.  That year, Lieutenant Colonel Sanchez Cerro had seized 
power to preempt an APRA electoral victory and begun to crack down on the organization.  
Apristas launched violent protests, killed twenty-six soldiers, and assassinated Cerro himself in 
1933.  The military retaliated by killing several thousand Apristas.4  The military opposed 
APRA’s populist ideology centered on the urban middle class.  APRA wanted to mobilize and 
empower the urban middle-class to create a State-directed capitalist economy.5     
The military once again intervened in 1968 due to President Belaúnde’s continued weak 
leadership.  Several other conditions led to the coup, including Haya de la Torre’s victory in the 
national elections that year and the military’s vow to keep APRA out of power, as well as the 
strong nationalistic sentiment in the military.  Another key factor was Belaúnde’s settlement with 
                                                 
1 Cuban style foco guerrilla movements were characterized by a military style organization under the control of one 
leader.  Their primary line of operation was military with political work taking a secondary role.  The foco theory 
was that communist revolution could be inspired by taking to the mountains and instructing the indigenous 
population on the importance of overthrowing the regime and coming down from the mountains to take the cities.  
These groups also typically wore olive drab uniforms to set themselves apart from the general population. 
2 Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, Modern Latin America, p. 204. 
3 Masterson, Militarism and Politics in Latin America, pp. 29-30. 
4 United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, The Peruvian Coup:   Reasons and 
Prospects, p. 3; Masterson, Militarism and Politics in Latin America, pp.33-34. 
5 Julio Cotler, “Democracy and National Integration in Peru,” in Cynthia McClintock and Abraham F. Lowenthal, 
eds., The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered, p. 8. 
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the U.S.-owned International Petroleum Corporation (IPC).6  The settlement with the IPC in 
August 1968, known as the Act of Talara, was a particularly unpopular decision.  At a time of 
growing national debt, rising inflation, and worsening unemployment, most Peruvians 
considered this a sell-out to the Americans and added to growing ‘anti-Yankee’ sentiment.  In 
essence, the Belaúnde administration took control of several oil fields from the Americans and, 
in return, dismissed a claim against the company for $144 million in “unjust profits.”  The 
decision led to a split in the PAP and guaranteed Belaúnde’s defeat in the national elections.   
 The military, which initially had supported Belaúnde and his economic reform measures, 
grew increasingly disillusioned with the government and cabinet ministers.  The more difficult 
the issue, the more reluctant the administration was to make a decision or take the action 
necessary to bring the economy under control.  The military high command made plans to 
intervene as early as 1966, using the recent coup in Argentina as a blueprint, but postponed 
action.  Prior to the election, APRA leaders had tried to gain military support by promising new 
equipment purchases and expressing regret over past clashes, but Army leaders were unswayed.    
 The combination of Belaúnde’s weak leadership, the Act of Talara, belief that the cabinet 
ministers were interested only in self-enrichment, the split in the PAP, and the probable APRA 
victory in the impending elections led the military to act.7   On October 3, 1968, a small group of 
army officers conducted the actual take-over and then invited the navy and air force to 
participate.  The commanders of the three services formed a “Revolutionary Junta” and named 
General Juan Velasco president.  He formed a cabinet from the top-ranking officers and 
surrounded himself with advisors made up of highly nationalistic army officers.  One of his first 
actions was the nationalization of the IPC, an extremely popular action in Peru but one that 
                                                 
6 C.I.A., Peruvian Coup, 1.  
7 Ibid, p. 5. 
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placed him at odds with the United States, which subsequently withdrew all aid.  This led 
Velasco to turn to the Soviet Bloc for support.8 
 Velasco established diplomatic and commercial relations with the Soviet Union and 
Eastern European countries and they, in turn, began sending economic and military aid to Peru.  
For example, from 1954-1968 Peru had received no funding from Communist countries.  But in 
1969, the Soviet Union sent $6 million in aid and in 1970 this increased to $28 million with an 
additional $25 million from Eastern European countries.9  This support from communist 
countries disappointed some in the government, but Velsaco was able to remain in power by 
capitalizing on anti-U.S. sentiment. 
 It is important to remember that the Peruvian armed forces, like those of most other Latin 
American countries, see themselves as the arbiter of national politics and believe it is their duty 
to intervene in the political process when internal stability is threatened.  That attitude affected 
civilian elected representatives and shaped all decision-making in the government.  Politicians in 
Peru to the present must always keep one eye on the military when taking action to ensure that it 
meets with military approval. 
 Velasco and his military regime were active in support of the peasants.  Since the mid 
1950’s the military had been a leading voice in favor of reforms to avoid rural unrest.  The 
government now made several attempts at agrarian reform, promising to break up the holdings of 
large landowners and distribute the land to the peasants.  While the government did not succeed 
in mobilizing the peasantry, other non-governmental organizations were able to operate more 
effectively in the highlands.  Two socialist confederations were particularly active.  The National 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
9 United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Communist Economic Credits and Grants Extended to Less Developed 
Countries 1954-70 and years 1969 and 1970. 
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Agrarian Confederation (CAN) was established in 1974 under official auspices.10  Some top 
government officials apparently hoped that CAN would provide a vehicle for government control 
over the peasantry, but CAN resisted such a role.  A second confederation, the Peruvian Peasant 
Confederation (CCP), also experienced considerable growth during the 70’s.  Peasants from both 
these groups occupied arable land on large haciendas and the government accepted their 
takeover.  However, as CAN became more independent and larger in numbers, the 
administration declared it illegal and disbanded it. 
These two groups provide examples of the peasantry’s ability to mobilize with outside 
influence and underscore the importance of dedicated leadership in that process.  In part as a 
result of recruitment by the two confederations, the vote for the Marxist left skyrocketed in the 
Peruvian highlands.  For example, 40 percent of the vote in the highlands and 27 percent 
nationwide went to Marxists candidates in 1978.11  This was an important indicator of the 
growing radicalization of the Peruvian countryside. 
  Another reason for the Marxist appeal was the increasingly unequal distribution of 
income.  The economy of Peru was almost entirely export-oriented and centered in the coastal 
and urban centers.  Nearly all goods produced were sold outside the country and most of the 
companies producing the goods were foreign-owned; therefore, little of the money found its way 
to the government or Peruvian economy.  These companies also provided the best-paying jobs to 
the few lucky enough to get them, mainly the better educated Peruvians of Spanish heritage who 
lived in these urban centers.  The rest of the poorly paid workers in these regions were turning to 
leftist workers’ unions.  In contrast, the mountainous interior of Peru was grossly 
underdeveloped and populated by Indians.  The only foreign-owned businesses were mining-
                                                 
10 Cynthia McClintock, “Peru’s Sendero Luminoso Rebellion: Origins and Trajectory,” in Susan Eckstein, ed, 
Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements, p. 74. 
11 Skidmore and Smith, Modern Latin America, p. 185. 
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related and the Indians who worked in the mines were exploited and paid very low wages and 
thus receptive to appeals by Marxist groups.  Additionally, this reliance on foreign-owned 
corporations made it difficult for the government to generate the revenue needed to carry out 
reforms that might ameliorate the plight of the masses.     
These conditions set the stage for the emergence of a group such as Sendero Luminoso.  
The government was unable to respond adequately to the needs of the people of Peru in general 
and the poverty-stricken peasants in particular.  This was true for both the elected leaders like 
President Belaúnde and the military junta.  Also, the activities of groups such as CAN and CCP 
demonstrated that the peasants could organize and take action.  Finally, education reform led to 
an increasing number of peasants becoming educated, but unable to find jobs in the weak 
economy.  The result was growing resentment which resulted in mass protests and workers 
strikes throughout Peru by the end of the 1970’s.  Military leaders grew disillusioned and agreed 
to a restoration of civilian rule.  At the time, however, they made it clear that they were leaving 
the government, but not relinquishing power.12  
Communism per se has never had widespread appeal in Peruvian society - the major 
political parties, such as PAP and APRA, were anti-Communist – but Marxist ideology had 
developed a significant following.13  However, there were several influential Marxist thinkers, 
the most prominent of which was José Carlos Mariátegui, who helped to found a Communist 
Party in 1929 that affiliated with the Communist International.14  Mariátegui was a vocal 
advocate of land reform because, he argued, the people of Peru could never be free until they had 
dealt decisively with the question of land-to-the-tiller.  He believed that the large estates had to 
                                                 
12 Philip Mauceri and Maxwell A. Cameron, “Unholy Alliance: Drugs, Corruption, and the Peruvian Military During 
the Fujimori Administration.” 
13 United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Peru and the United States: The Implication of the IPC Controversy, 
p. 15. 
14 Skidmore and Smith, Modern Latin America, p. 375. 
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be broken up and the land distributed to the peasants.  He envisioned the creation of a utopian 
society based on ancient Incan collectivism and communal traditions.15  Mariátegui died in April 
1930 without having realized his dream. 
In the late 1950’s, the split between Beijing and Moscow created new opportunities for 
Latin American revolutionaries.  The Maoist model of peasant-based revolution inspired Latin 
Americans long dissatisfied with the bureaucratized orthodox communist parties.  Chinese 
Communist influence grew in the region, a fact highlighted by the trip to China by several 
communist leaders from Peru at the invitation of the Chinese government.16  This provided the 
opportunity for young, impressionable individuals to see first-hand the events in China and the 
application of “true communism” by Mao Zedong.  It also led to the development of a group 
committed to spreading its own form of Maoism based on the Chinese experiences.     
Marxism found its greatest appeal among the intellectuals, historians and economists.  
Many of these leftists taught in the universities, which gave them the ability to influence the 
student population.  Even in the late 1960s during the Velasco regime, they gained greater 
influence by defending ultra-nationalist causes.17  Despite this broad exposure, these groups 
were unable to organize or effect any real change in Peru.   
                                                
Sendero Luminoso was much shrewder and more dedicated than the Peruvian guerrillas 
of the 1960s, and much more effective in building an alliance between its militants and the 
peasantry.  According to Sendero propaganda, it traces its roots to Mariátegui’s vision of a 
utopian society achieved through violence and preserved through dictatorship.18  In contrast to 
earlier revolutionary groups, Sendero Luminoso did not simply arm the peasantry and attempt to 
 
15 Ibid, p. 197.  
16 United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Plans of Chinese Communist Party to Call Meeting of World 
Communist Leader. 
17 C.I.A., The Implications of the IPC Controversy, p. 15. 
18 “Military Line,” p. 3. 
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foment unrest, but instead studied its culture in order to understand its motivations and needs.  In 
this regard, Sendero’s patience, dedication, and long-term perspective have been virtually unique 
among Peruvian revolutionary groups.19  This long-range approach, as well as leadership and 
organization, were the keys to its success.   
Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, the original leader of Sendero Luminoso, was a political 
activist in Ayacucho for more than fifteen years before the group launched its violent campaign.  
Guzmán was born on December 3, 1934 in Arequipa, a large city off Peru’s southern coast.  He 
joined the Communist Party of Peru (PCP) at the age of fifteen as it was splitting along Marxist-
Maoist lines.  Guzmán recalled in an interview his childhood memories of strikes and protests 
and confrontation between the Apristas and Communists.  At the same time he began studying 
Marxist material because he found it interesting.  He graduated from the University of Arequipa, 
where he had earned degrees in philosophy and law with theses on the “Kantian Theory of 
Space” and “The Bourgeois Democratic State.”  20   
Guzmán began teaching philosophy at the National University of San Cristobal of 
Huamanga in Ayacucho in 1962.  He was also active mobilizing support for his belief in the 
armed struggle and disseminating his message among the more charismatic and popular teachers.  
He organized and committed significant effort to political meetings and discussions at his home.  
Guzmán was one of the main reasons the PCP split into two factions, when he formed the Red 
Faction or Bandera Roja (Red Flag) of the communist party in 1963, which advocated armed 
conflict and followed the Maoist philosophy of peasant revolution.  Guzmán voiced disdain for 
any movement that differed from his own; he felt that only through a violent armed revolution 
could any real change occur and that anything else would be wasted effort. 
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Guzmán guided the Red Faction toward his goal of creating a revolution in Peru starting 
in the countryside and eventually surrounding the cities.  In other words, by creating a peasant 
revolution in the Andean highlands, the insurgency would starve out the cities that rely on the 
produce from the peasants and eventually create unrest and revolution in the cities.  During this 
time, a series of peasant protests and strikes forced the government to make concessions to their 
demands.  Guzmán felt vindicated that the peasantry could bring about change.  In 1964, the PCP 
split again with one faction joining other leftist groups to form the People’s Defense Front, a 
group advocating use of the electoral process.  Guzmán demonstrated his commitment to violent 
revolution when he declined to join this front.  He criticized the new coalition as ineffective and 
not representative of the interests of the peasants and insisted that the party be rebuilt by 
upholding “Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought and the thought of Mariátegui,” and by 
sweeping away revisionism.21  Guzmán consistently adhered to his philosophy advocating the 
need for violent revolution, following the theories of Chairman Mao.  In 1965, Guzmán traveled 
to China during the height of the Cultural Revolution and witnessed the revolutionary 
transformation taking place, including the actions of the Red Guard and the relentless combat 
against revisionism.22  The visit profoundly influenced him and shaped his thought and 
philosophy.  Although Mao later admitted that the Cultural Revolution had been wrong, Guzmán 
never wavered.  He came away from his trip convinced of the need for a protracted people’s war, 
one that would target the “three mountains that weigh on the people: imperialism, bureaucrat-
capitalism, and semi-feudalism.”23  
By 1966, Guzmán and the Red Faction gained control of the University council which led 
to support for Guzmán among Ayacucho’s urban population.  This gave him control of the 
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university newspaper, which he used to publish fiery editorials and articles that ridiculed the 
government.    By 1969, Guzmán was the head of Academics for the Department of Humanities.  
He promptly changed the curriculum to promote his agenda of armed revolution.  In response to 
the growing communist threat, the Velasco regime ordered the arrest of the leaders of the 
People’s Defense Front and the Red Faction of the PCP.  Guzmán used his short stay in jail to 
win key leaders over to his cause, which ultimately allowed him to consolidate power in the Red 
Faction and his idea of armed conflict.  This consolidation left two main groups in the party: the 
Red Faction in Ayacucho led by Guzmán, and the Bolshevik faction centered in Lima.  
Eventually, the group in Lima splintered after failing to achieve any significant gains through the 
electoral process, leaving Guzmán’s faction as the de facto Communist party, which adopted the 
name Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path around 1970.  By 1976 he had developed sufficient 
internal control to establish base areas in preparation for armed struggle.24   
Guzmán focused on the education system as a means of developing the cadres necessary 
to carry the word to the peasantry in the countryside.  As a result, the students learning under his 
radical curriculum eventually became teachers in the surrounding peasant communities.  From 
this time until 1981, the university produced roughly 5,000 teachers.  Although there is no data 
on how many of these teachers were Senderistas, the number was significant because by the mid 
1970’s, Sendero Luminoso virtually controlled the entire high school education system in 
Ayacucho.25   
During the Seventh Plenum of April 1977, the party adopted the slogan “Construction 
serving the armed struggle” and Guzmán began sending his cadres into the countryside to build 
regional committees or shadow governing bodies.  The next year, the party endorsed “Outline for 
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 20
the Armed Struggle,” which made the countryside the principal theater of action and in June 
1979 the Party announced the People’s War.  Prior to launching the People’s War, Guzmán had 
to overcome several obstacles, including removing those who doubted that revolutionary 
conditions existed and that an uprising could be successful, and those who still believed that non-
violent means were best.  This led to the formation of the “First Company in Deeds,” a group 
made up of the most loyal followers pledged to be the first to start the revolution.26  The initial 
plan was to boycott the upcoming elections and then begin armed conflict.  The First Company 
would conduct acts of sabotage and military assaults, armed agitation and selective annihilation, 
and distribute propaganda.   
Sendero Luminoso fanatically adhered to the policies set forth by Abimael Guzmán.  
Members of Sendero Luminoso or Senderistas consider themselves “Gang of Four Maoists.”  
During the consolidation of power in the communist party this fanaticism appealed more to the 
students than to the peasants.  Sendero Luminoso has shown little inclination to changing its 
ideology, remaining fully committed to installing Marxist oriented rule.  Its leadership points out 
that  
it is through violence that our people have conquered their economic 
gains, rights, and freedoms.  Everything in fact was won through revolutionary 
violence, in ardent battles against the reactionary violence; that is how the eight 
hour day was won, our lands were conquered and defended, our rights were won 
and tyrants were overthrown.  Revolutionary violence is, therefore, the very 
essence of our historical process.…[I]t is easy to understand that the development 
and victory of the Peruvian revolution, of our democratic revolution, the 
emancipation of the people and the class, will be achieved solely through the 
greatest revolutionary war of our people, raising the masses in arms through the 
People’s War.27   
 
The members of Sendero Luminoso say that they carry their “lives on their 
fingertips,” ready to give their lives for the cause on a moment’s notice to advance the 
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world revolution.28  As a matter of fact, Guzmán and other leaders of Sendero Luminoso 
felt that once the revolution advanced in Peru, it would be the catalyst for a world-wide 
revolution, serving as the example for millions of what was possible through violence. 
  Guzmán was convinced that, by defeating the enemy and controlling small rural 
communities, more peasants would join the revolution, enabling them to ultimately capture the 
cities.  For good measure, he added that the struggle would free Peru from Yankee domination 
while serving the worldwide proletarian revolution.29  Guzmán stated three laws that govern the 
People’s War:  People’s War in the countryside to the city; construction of the revolutionary 
armed forces, the People’s Guerrilla Army; strategy and tactics that are formed through the 
encirclement and annihilation campaigns.30  He outlined additional goals including peasant 
participation in government, repudiation of foreign debt, and nationalization of foreign 
companies and holdings.  Guzmán’s philosophy became known as ‘Gonzalo Thought,’ so named 
because the party faithful knew him as Chairman Gonzalo.  He also claimed to be the ‘fourth 
sword of Marxism’ after Lenin, Marx, and Mao Zedong.31 
Sendero Luminoso is organized around three main divisions:  the central apparatus, the 
People’s Guerrilla Army, and the Popular Front.  The first consists of a Politburo of five 
members who form the real decision-making body of the party.  The Politburo uses the Central 
Committee consisting of nineteen members to disseminate orders and guidance to six regional 
committees based on geographic regions.32  The Popular Front is made up of several legal 
organizations that provide support functions to the leaders and the People’s Guerrilla Army, 
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including recruiting, legal defense for arrested members, and family support for members killed 
in action or imprisoned.  
Guzmán structured the People’s Guerrilla Army after the pattern Mao Zedong laid out in 
his works and based upon the cell.  Each cell consists of five to ten members, each with 
specialized duties.  There is little to no intercellular contact in order to minimize damage should 
government force capture a cell member.33  The cell leader receives orders from a commander, 
who controls several cells, loosely resembling a platoon structure.  These commanders also 
report to a company commander who is usually a member of the local People’s Committee.  The 
People’s Guerrilla Army not only fights, but participates in the organization and daily 
functioning of the base areas.  The base area is a geographic locality where the government 
forces are subject to hostile action and revolutionaries receive at least passive support, and not 
actual structures built in the countryside.  People’s Committees, elected by a delegate assembly 
composed of one-third each of party members, poor peasants, and middle-class peasants, govern 
the base areas.  These committees divide the land that has been taken from the big landlords and 
the government, first to those who have none, then to those who have some land already.  The 
People’s Committees also enforce collective planting and harvesting with assistance from the 
People’s Guerrilla Army.  They form new laws and provide justice in the base areas by 
organizing people’s trials where mass meetings of the community vote to decide the guilt or 
innocence of someone accused of a crime and to decide penalties.  Sendero formed dozens of 
these committees to replace the local governments in areas they controlled.  Several base areas 
and their people’s committees were grouped together under the control of regional committees, 
composed of senior military and political representatives from the people’s committees.   
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Within each base area or district, the people’s committee selects an overall military 
commander and several political commissioners.  This group also functions under Guzmán’s 
control, as the forum for both military and political matters.  The commander forms the soldiers 
into several groups with responsibilities for local sentry duties, reconnaissance, arresting traitors, 
and preventing dissemination of enemy propaganda.  They also provide stretcher-bearers, 
distribute food, and conduct comfort missions.34   
During its formation and consolidation, Sendero Luminoso not only replaced the 
government organizations with its own people’s committees, but had to impose its own societal 
laws on the people to indoctrinate them fully into the communist party.  Prior to the start of the 
guerrilla war, Guzmán consolidated power not only through the University, but also through the 
regional committee of Ayacucho; all to continue to forward the premise that only through violent 
action could change occur.  Guzmán directed the regional committee to conduct three main 
functions:  political indoctrination of the peasantry, military training, and logistical support of the 
guerrillas.35   
Ayacucho was an ideal area to launch Guzmán’s People’s War.  The region possessed a 
rebellious cultural tradition, having consistently voted opposition candidates to the assembly in 
successive elections.  Sendero’s popularity in Ayacucho derived from the leaders’ ability to 
identify with its social base and address local concerns.  Sendero neither promoted nor restricted 
religious observations and conducted all training using Quechua, which is the main language of 
the peasants.  
Outside leadership is of particular consequence in turning localized rural rebellions into 
nationally coordinated revolutionary movements.  Peasants typically engage in revolutionary 
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activity when a revolutionary elite adds a new layer of leadership and doctrine to peasant life.36  
Sendero was unique among Peruvian Marxist groups in its openness to young provincial 
militants as leaders.  Initially, the group’s leadership was predominantly white intellectuals, but 
by 1980 the leadership was largely Ayacucho-born.  These locally-developed militants pushed to 
begin the armed struggle in 1980.  In contrast to previous Peruvian revolutionaries from middle-
class backgrounds, the Senderistas were prepared to live austerely for many years in remote, 
bleak places.  They learned the Indian language if they did not already know it and often married 
into the communities.  Much of Sendero’s strength came from its success in garnering support 
from the Peruvian Indians, a segment comprising close to one-half of the country’s population.  
Successive governments ignored and even suppressed the Indians, making them ideal candidates 
for recruitment in subversive movements.  Authorities ignored the Indian population to the extent 
that it was almost inevitable that it forge links with revolutionary movements.37   
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CHAPTER 3 SENDERO ACTION AND EFFECT 
Sendero Luminoso capitalized on the worsening economic and social situation in Peru 
and was fully prepared to launch its insurgency.  Conversely, the security forces were not 
ready to conduct a counterinsurgency - the military was organized for a conventional war 
against its neighbors and the police suffered from years of under-funding and poor training.  
The government, in general, was not prepared to face a challenge from a well-organized, 
aggressive guerrilla force due to poor relationships between the administration and security 
forces, especially the military.  This situation manifested itself as Belaúnde chose to first, 
ignore the initial Sendero actions and then later, offer limited response.  Sendero benefited 
from the weak response by expanding to a serious force that threatened the Peruvian 
government, which finally deployed the military to counter the insurgents – marking the 
country’s descent into a state of general violence. 
 
During the 1980’s, Latin American countries were experiencing great economic 
hardship as a result of years of increasing debt.  The situation in Peru in 1980 was one of 
despair.  Most of Peru’s economy was geared toward making loan payments to its creditors, 
resulting in spiraling inflation, business closures and unemployment.  Peru’s gross domestic 
product fell by 8.3% from 1981 to 1983.1  The people at the bottom of the economic ladder, 
the peasants, suffered the most because nearly all of their sources of income disappeared 
completely.    
This economic uncertainty and social injustice provided a fertile environment for 
terrorist activity.  The Sierra was among the hardest hit regions and this allowed Guzmán and 
Sendero Luminoso to continue to develop the movement and gain followers.  Sendero 
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capitalized on the bleak economic conditions across the country by recruiting among the 
various disgruntled groups such as striking workers, anti-government political protesters, and 
peasants.  Another potential target for Sendero recruitment was the coca farmers and 
narcotraffickers.  Peru was under pressure from the United States to conduct coca eradication 
efforts and these measures angered the coca farmers.  Coca cultivation was the only means of 
income for many of the peasants and government eradication policy did not provide for 
substitute crops.   
This economic and social crisis was the precise condition Guzmán needed to launch 
Sendero Luminoso into action.  All the government economic relief was focused on the 
economically developed Costa region.  The people of the Sierra were suffering at below-
subsistence levels and looking for relief.  Sendero Luminoso cadre promised the peasants a 
better life if they were willing to join the cause.  Guzmán’s vision of a peasant-governed 
society appealed to many who were convinced the Lima government did not care about them.  
The time for action had finally come. 
The government forces that would oppose Sendero Luminoso varied in quality and 
capability.  The Peruvian military consists of three services, the Army, the Navy (including 
the Marine Corps), and the Air Force.  The Army is considered the primary service and 
consists of 85,000 soldiers, mostly of Indian descent.2  The officer corps is made up of 
mestizos, or mixed personnel with a mostly middle class background.  The Navy has about 
27,000 personnel and is considered an exclusive career path for well-off white Peruvians.3  
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The Air force consists of about 15,000 personnel and is primarily involved in counter 
narcotics operations.4   
Despite the loss of U.S. support during the Velasco regime, the Army, on paper, was a 
formidable one indeed.  The American government withdrew military support to Peru after 
the Velasco coup and over human rights issues.  The Carter administration continued sending 
vocal and angry rhetoric to Central and South America to improve its human rights record.  In 
response to this pressure, many Latin American countries, including Peru, renounced U.S. 
assistance.  This allowed the Soviet Union to move into Latin America.  Moscow viewed the 
break between the U.S. and Latin America as an exploitable situation.  Many of these 
countries welcomed Soviet arms dealers and advisors, including Peru.   
  As it turns out, Peru was the only Latin American country to buy Soviet hardware.  In 
1982, Peru purchased several Su-22 Fighter bombers, Mi-8 Hip helicopters, T-55 medium 
tanks, antiaircraft artillery, SA-3 and SA-7 missiles and small arms.5  In all, Peru spent close 
to $1.2 billion dollars on hardware and technical assistance.6  It also made purchases from 
France, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and Israel.  Even the U.S. sold arms to Peru as it 
agreed to tougher counter-drug efforts.  The philosophy of the military leaders was simple:  
‘the best arms at the best price, regardless of the seller.’  This made the Peruvian military one 
of the most modern and formidable in Latin America.  Of course, the military was not geared 
toward a counterinsurgency fight, but a conventional ground war against its neighboring 
countries, Ecuador and Chile, with which it had engaged in several border clashes in the past. 
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 In 1980, all three services and the National Intelligence Service (SIN) operated under 
the direct control of the President, the commander in chief.  The military also formed a Joint 
Command of the Armed Forces that established military policy, training priorities, and 
conducted routine operations during peacetime.  The Joint Command was headed by a 
Chairman, the position rotating among the services in one-year terms.  This organization 
appeared to give the President of Peru great power, but the military and intelligence services 
were not integrated which resulted, on several occasions, in the military being operationally 
and tactically surprised.  In addition, the Joint Command could overrule the commander in 
chief and therefore actually controlled the military.  This relationship forced the chief 
executive to seek the approval of the Joint Command prior to taking any action that might 
impact on the military.     
 In contrast to the military, the Peruvian police, poorly manned, funded and equipped, 
were among the worst in Latin America.  The force consists of three divisions under the 
direction of the Ministry of Interior with about 5,000 personnel total.7  The Civil Guard, 
similar to a typical metropolitan police force, is the largest division and is responsible for 
crime control and general security.  The next division is the Republican Guard, which is 
responsible for prison security and special guard duties, such as the President’s guard.  The 
third division is the Peruvian Investigative Police (PIP), a plainclothes force comparable in 
duties to the FBI.  Each of the divisions possessed its own specialized counterterrorism or 
counterinsurgency unit.  The Civil Guard operated the Sinchi counterinsurgency battalion, 
roughly 400 personnel.  The Republican Guard manned the Llapan Atic counterterrorism unit, 
similar to a SWAT team.  The PIP had a large counterterrorism directorate (DIRCOTE).  At 
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the start of the 1980s, none of these organizations were capable of conducting security 
operations against a dedicated foe.    
Sendero initiated its first actions in May 1980, just after the military relinquished 
power to Belaúnde.  These consisted of random acts of terror, such as assassinating local 
government officials and sabotaging unguarded infrastructure, a Phase I insurgency according 
to U.S. military doctrine.  Senderistas moved into many mountain communities, combining 
ideological indoctrination with physical intimidation against those who resisted their call to 
smash authority and establish an egalitarian utopia.  The insurgents then embarked on a 
campaign of low-risk, high-profile terrorist attacks consisting primarily of dynamiting 
electrical towers, public buildings, and such symbols of authority as the Justice Ministry and 
police posts.8  These first actions were minor irritants to the government and confusing to the 
people, who did not understand their implications.  A Communist Party pamphlet described 
the action as “striking with agitation and armed propaganda through the seizure of radio 
stations, leaflets, and posters.”9  These pamphlets went on to describe these initial strikes as 
“a defiant political blow of transcendental significance that, displaying rebellious red flags 
and hoisting hammers and sickles, proclaimed:  ‘It is right to rebel’ and ‘Power grows from 
the barrel of a gun.’”10   
                                                
The various independent cells continued to carry out acts of terrorism in the Sierra and 
occasionally around Lima.  Intermittently, these cells joined together in detachments to 
conduct larger operations.  Most of the activity occurred around the provinces of Ayrabamba 
and Ayasarca and around the outskirts of Lima.  One of the more daring early actions was 
setting fire to the San Martin municipal building.  These early acts were in keeping with 
 
8 Skidmore and Smith, Modern Latin America, p. 210.  
9 Heriberto Ocasio, “Why the People’s War is Justified and Why it is the Road to Liberation,” p. 3.  
10 Military Line, p. 5. 
 30
Guzmán’s philosophy of focusing the rebellion in the countryside and surrounding the cities.  
At this time, Sendero Luminoso consisted only of a few armed cells and possessed only crude 
weapons including, revolvers, a few shotguns, and a small amount of dynamite stolen from 
local mining companies.  In one example of Guzmán’s hearkening to the Incan traditions of 
the peasants, his cells used old Incan slings to hurl the dynamite at the targets.11 
Armed with these few crude weapons, and also with clubs and knives and sometimes 
even fake wooden rifles, the cells attacked the local landlords or large landowners and divided 
their holdings among the peasants.  This redistribution of land among the peasants was 
extremely popular.  For years they had waited for promised government land reform.  Sendero 
Luminoso moved in and accomplished what the government was unable to do.   
Although the early Sendero attacks centered on the Andean highlands, they 
occasionally struck selected sites in the cities, especially in Lima.  One of the favorite targets 
was the United States.  Sendero cells attacked anything they considered symbols of Yankee 
imperialism, such as the Bayer chemical plant, the U.S. Embassy, and the symbolic Kennedy 
statue in the affluent Lima suburb of Miraflores.12  From 1980 until 1982, by carrying out 
these effective, small-unit actions across a large area of Peru, Sendero was able to establish 
control in extensive areas of Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Apurimac.  Some of the more 
notable attacks during this time include the attack on the U.S. Embassy on August 31, 1981, 
when dynamite thrown from a passing car caused structural damage to the chancery and 
ambassador’s residence.  By October 1981, the government had declared a state of emergency 
in Cangello, La Mar, Huanta, and Victor Fijardo provinces.  Established for 60 days, it 
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granted the government extra powers to impose curfews, detain people, and restrict freedom 
of movement.13   
According to Communist Party propaganda, the development of the guerrilla war had 
three components:  armed strikes, conquering bases, and developing the bases.14  The armed 
strikes lasted from May 1981 to December 1982 with the main objective of taking control of 
more areas of Peru in order to establish base areas.  Guzmán later called this period the War 
of Little Wars, denoting the independence of the separate actions.  The group’s supporting 
effort during this time was to capture or steal as many weapons as possible in order to equip 
the growing number of insurgents who flocked to the cause.  The rebels continued to attack 
the local leaders or gamonales as the primary target as well as isolated, weakly defended 
police detachments as a secondary target.  Once they gained control of an area, they 
established People’s Committees to replace the local governing body.  These committees 
ensured that an area, once under Sendero control, remained under Sendero control, initially by 
providing services and benefits to the people.  For example, the insurgents often entered a 
village and rid the area of thieves, abusive bureaucrats, and other undesirable people.  They 
also provided services such as education, agricultural assistance, and medical care. Those that 
did not willingly participate were subjected to intimidation and violence.  The People’s 
Committees were the key to the consolidation of Sendero power over growing areas of the 
Andean highlands.  In two short years, Sendero Luminoso expanded to a phase II guerrilla 
war. 
By 1982, Sendero Luminoso was well on its way to controlling several provinces in 
and around Ayacucho and was becoming increasingly bolder in its attacks.  It also continued 
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to target U.S. and other foreign-owned or associated structures.  The U.S. Embassy reported 
that the insurgency posed a threat to government stability and confirmed that the insurgents 
were arming themselves with small arms and machineguns purchased in Peru or stolen from 
police and military posts.15  The rebels funded their operations during these early years 
through robberies, typically striking buses filled with foreign tourists.   
Sendero was attracting increasing numbers of followers.  New recruits were subjected 
to extensive political indoctrination and paramilitary training conducted at clandestine 
“people’s schools” prior to being put into cells to carry out attacks.  Additionally, new recruits 
often conducted their initial attacks alone under a single leader in order to prove their 
commitment to the cause.  These measures increased security from penetration by security 
personnel, but also limited the speed of growth and size of the insurgent force.  Nevertheless, 
as a testament to their increasing popularity among young peasants, in a 1982 poll 82 percent 
listed Sendero Luminoso as the most appealing group to join.16 
The Belaúnde government’s weak response to the insurgency also contributed to rebel 
popularity.  For more than two years, the government deliberately ignored the Sendero 
rebellion.  In most public statements, Belaúnde referred to members of Sendero Luminoso as 
thugs and bandits and attempted to dismiss the threat they posed.  The administration sent the 
Sinchi battalion to Ayacucho in a feeble attempt to restore order, but the unit was abusive to 
the people and ineffective against Sendero.17  Belaúnde was hesitant to use the military 
because he feared its leaders.  He remembered how General Velasco had ousted him in 1968 
and the experience left him timid when dealing with the military.  The remoteness of the areas 
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that Sendero Luminoso occupied also made it difficult to mount an effective campaign of 
repression against them.   
In March 1982, Sendero Luminoso ushered in a new phase of the rebellion.  In a well-
coordinated military offensive, 300 guerrillas operating in three separate columns, assaulted 
and held the maximum security prison of Ayacucho and released a total of 247 prisoners, 
including over 100 suspected terrorists.18  The rebels followed this success with simultaneous 
strikes on several civil guard posts and municipal offices.  The insurgents also sabotaged the 
electrical towers near Lima, blacking out the city for several hours.  Communist Party 
propaganda described these successful operations: 
The people’s Liberation Army carries out guerrilla actions against the 
armed forces, leads the masses to attack and liberate the so-called “strategic 
hamlets” of the government, carries out assassinations of proven enemies of 
the people, and carries out sabotage of the economic foundations of the old 
state.  In cities they have conducted massive armed strikes that have paralyzed 
commerce and industry for days at a time- preparing the masses in the cities 
for insurrection, basing themselves mainly in the vast shantytowns of urban 
poor that surround the city centers.19 
 
This forced Belaúnde to act.  He expanded the emergency zone to include sixteen 
provinces in Ayacucho and the neighboring departments of Apurimac and Huancavelica.  The 
emergency zone decree allowed the police to move in once again and assume control of the 
region by restricting movement and suspending civil rights.  Government forces could detain 
individuals for weeks without cause.  Human rights groups accused the police of committing 
many atrocities once they moved into areas and some statistics seem to support those claims.  
For example, there had been only fourteen civilian casualties prior to 1982 and none were 
listed as missing or ‘disappeared’ – a popular term used to describe those who were missing 
and presumed dead at the hands of the government – but once the police moved in, the 
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19 Ibid. 
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numbers increased.  The real victims were the peasants.  On one side, they had the 
government, which curtailed their movement, imposed curfews, and treated them harshly.  On 
the other side, the Senderistas threatened to kill anyone suspected of supporting or 
cooperating with the government.  As one peasant stated, the situation was a “plague on both 
your houses.”20  One thing was clear:  Sendero Luminoso had gained the government’s 
attention and was becoming a serious guerrilla force. 
How could Sendero Luminoso – essentially, a band of organized peasants with crude 
weapons and no formal military training – achieve such success?  Most of it can be attributed 
to the laxity and inefficiency of the civilian security forces.  Rivalries among the various 
intelligence and law enforcement organizations hampered the government’s efforts.  The 
competing organizations often refused to share information or to follow up leads.  The 
administration needed to modernize and restructure these groups to centralize intelligence and 
law enforcement activities and facilitate closer coordination.  There was no doubt that the 
situation was getting worse throughout Peru.   
For much of 1982, government authorities in the Ayacucho department withdrew from 
small, exposed outposts to static, defensive positions in larger communities.  Sendero 
Luminoso units expanded into evacuated areas and maintained pressure on the demoralized 
police and civil authorities through a campaign of assassinations, ambushes, and attacks on 
isolated outposts. Still, Belaúnde hoped he could avoid committing the military and use the 
police to maintain order.  But despite Belaúnde’s hesitance to use the military, several factors 
made military intervention more likely including evidence of increasing popular support for 
Sendero Luminoso, expanding terrorist activity in the northern and jungle regions of Peru, and 
larger and more sophisticated operations against important government targets. 
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Finally, at the end of the year, President Belaúnde granted control of the 
counterinsurgency to the military.  The military quickly moved into Sendero-controlled areas 
and performed defensive functions, while the police – benefiting from military transportation, 
communications, and weaponry - conducted more aggressive patrolling.  In December, the 
armed forces entered Ayacucho and launched an ambitious counterinsurgency campaign.  The 
addition of the military to the fight against Sendero Luminoso instantly improved morale 
across the various government agencies.  The military, in general, behaved much better 
toward the populace than did the Sinchis and other police forces, and popular support for the 
government started to rise.  The restoration of the government presence in small towns and 
villages put pressure on Sendero and caused the withdrawal of its activists from communities 
where previously they had enjoyed free rein.  The use of the military also freed the Civil 
Guard from extra guard duties, thereby enabling the police to take a more aggressive stance 
and initiate security patrols in the countryside, which encouraged locals to inform on Sendero 
sympathizers and activists.   These factors brought about a major consequence – it forced 
Sendero Luminoso increasingly to use violence and coercion against the peasants in order to 
receive support.      
Prior to the military counterinsurgency campaign in the south central highlands, 
Sendero Luminoso generally had enjoyed active support among the peasant population in the 
emergency zone, followed Maoist ideals, and was helpful to the people.  After the military 
offensive, Sendero Luminoso increasingly had to resort to coercion of the population in order 
to maintain control.  If the peasants provided support at all, it was only passive, consisting 
mostly of information on recent military activity.  The peasants no longer willingly spied on 
the government forces, nor willingly fed and sheltered Senderistas, out of fear that military 
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patrols would find out and impose their own swift justice.  When the military entered a 
Sendero-controlled village, the insurgents would disappear into the surrounding countryside, 
leaving the villagers at the mercy of the military patrols.  The soldiers dealt harshly with those 
they suspected of aiding the insurgency.  Senderistas often returned to villages right after the 
military units departed and assassinated ‘traitors’ or anyone believed to be helping the 
government.   
The military offensive also produced a climate of revenge and a flood of rumors, 
including some regarding the alleged death of Guzmán.21  The rebels claimed that the 
government encouraged peasants to kill Senderistas or anyone suspected of being an 
insurgent.  Belaúnde countered that the violence stemmed from long-standing rivalries 
between highland communities.  When the military moved into a new area, the local leaders 
often informed the commander that Senderistas were active in neighboring villages or 
provinces, when in fact they were just trying to enact revenge for old disputes.  The 
government also charged that Sendero Luminoso was being supported by foreign countries or 
groups, but the available evidence indicates it was not.  For example, most weapons captured 
from the rebels were of local registry.22  Belaúnde probably made the claim in order to 
enhance the chances of receiving foreign assistance himself.  Despite some negative results, 
there is no denying that the military involvement hampered Sendero Luminoso and was a 
popular move among the security forces and the population.  One senior Army General said 
that the president took the right approach in giving the military a secondary role and leaving 
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the police as the main effort because it allowed the military to initiate civic action projects to 
gain further public support.23   
In response to the new military campaign and series of Sendero setbacks early in 1983, 
Guzmán outlined a new strategy he called ‘the Great Plan of Conquering Bases.’24  This plan 
outlined four tasks:  1) a general reorganization of the party, 2) the creation of the People’s 
Guerrilla Army and the Revolutionary Defense Front of the People, 3) the consolidation of the 
People’s Committees in the countryside and the Revolutionary Defense Movement of the 
People in the cities, and 4) the Military Plan of Conquering Bases.  The reorganization of the 
party consisted of decentralizing control of military operations to allow individual cell leaders 
more freedom of action to increase the pressure on the government forces and regain control 
of the areas lost to them. 
Sendero increasingly strayed from the methods that brought it early success.  It built 
an impressive base of support among the population by blending into the community.  The 
rebels provided services and established law and order and reversed years of government 
neglect.  Yet, when the security forces moved in, Sendero abandoned its long-term strategy of 
making friends and building alliances among traditionally oppressed villagers.  Instead, the 
Senderistas became oppressive and abusive, coercing support among the people.  This caused 
Sendero Luminoso to lose much of its support.  The peasants and people living in the 
emergency zone pragmatically showed support to whoever happened to be controlling the 
immediate area at the time.   
The military knew it had to do something to consolidate gains and this resulted in the 
government’s initiating a civil works campaign in order to improve the life of the people in 
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the emergency zone and retain their support.  The government committed millions of dollars 
and built new infrastructure such as roads, improvements on the electrical grid, and improved 
water supplies.   In an effort to demonstrate confidence that his policies were working, 
Belaúnde made a surprise visit to the city of Ayacucho in June 1983.25  The Ministers of the 
Interior and Energy and Mines, as well as all three service ministers and the commanding 
generals of Peru’s three national police forces accompanied him.  The president reviewed a 
military honor guard, presided over a downtown parade by military and police units, and 
participated in a flag raising ceremony where he paid tribute to the security forces engaged in 
countering Sendero Luminoso.  He also made several high-profile visits to various other 
towns, in some cases to inaugurate public works projects and emphasize the efforts the 
government was making for the people.   
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CHAPTER 4  GOVERNMENT RESPONSE (1983-1990) 
 
 For the remainder of the 1980’s, Peru witnessed an erratic counterinsurgency 
campaign, as successive administrations wrestled with competing demands in an attempt to 
defeat Sendero.  Belaúnde ceded control of the counterinsurgency to the military at the 
expense of civic works projects.  The military established its presence throughout the 
Emergency Zone and worked to restore local governments, including creating local militias to 
help defend government-controlled areas.  The security forces had some successes, but were 
better known for a series of abuses and atrocities.  Additionally, the chief executive failed to 
balance counter-narcotics efforts with the counterinsurgency and lost U.S. support, while 
driving the narco-industry to Sendero for protection.  By the time of Belaúnde’s ouster in the 
national elections, Peru was an abusive martial state and the insurgency was spreading to new 
regions.  The new president, Alan Garcia, attempted to address the needs of the population 
while bringing the military under control.   He launched a series of expensive civic projects, 
while reorganizing the military to make it more responsive to civilian control.  The 
government also offered amnesty to the insurgents and increased its support to the local 
militias.  The administration was successful in reducing the insurgency to previous levels, but 
its economic initiatives eventually proved catastrophic to the economy and the 
counterinsurgency.  By the time of his defeat in the national elections, the economy was in 
disarray, death squads appeared and Sendero was once again on the rise. 
 
The military expanded its counterinsurgency campaign throughout the Emergency 
Zone beginning in 1983.  Its first priority was to identify pro-Sendero communities and then 
send company-sized patrols into those areas.  The forces conducted raids on suspected 
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insurgent strongholds in order to kill or capture guerrillas, but the raids often resulted in 
arbitrary acts of violence against the populace.  Soldiers often burned entire villages, and 
there were many reports of rapes, beatings, torture and other atrocities.  Later, government 
officials learned of multiple mass graves in the area which the locals attributed to this 
violence.1   The second priority was to reestablish civilian control in the emergency zone.  
One method the military employed was to create local civil defense patrols among the peasant 
community, otherwise known as Rondas Campesinos or Montoneras.2  These groups 
defended the communities against Sendero incursions and relieved the government forces 
from having to garrison towns.  Unfortunately, they also often abused their power, further 
escalating the violence.  
 According to members of Sendero Luminoso, the military campaign was nothing more 
than persecution, repression, and torture of the peasants.  On several occasions, troops moved 
into villages and imprisoned large numbers of residents, sometimes capturing insurgents, and 
then killed them and placed them in mass graves.  The most hated of the various security 
forces was the Sinchis, the counterinsurgency battalion of the Civil Guard.  Since first 
operating in the area in 1982, the Sinchis earned a reputation for being extremely brutal.  
Former prisoners routinely accused the Sinchis of torturing prisoners, raping women, and 
murdering suspected insurgents.3  The counterguerrilla activity created a condition of general 
violence, also known as the Dirty War, in the southern Sierra.  In all, from 1983 to 1984, more 
than 8,700 Peruvians were killed and another 4,000 “disappeared.”4  Guzmán claimed that 
these harsh government actions aided the revolution by increasing the size of the People’s 
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Guerrilla Army, creating more People’s committees and base areas, and adding to the party.  
Years later, he spoke in an interview about the most difficult test Sendero Luminoso had to 
face was the government’s ‘genocide’ of 1983 and 1984 – how they fought through those 
great difficulties and came out strengthened.5   
As the counterguerrilla campaign continued into 1984, the violence between the 
military and Sendero Luminoso increased to horrible proportions.  Each operation resulted in 
high casualties.  The level of violence was so high that the population became almost 
indifferent to the death toll – fifty people in the San Francisco area, thirty peasants in Chiara, 
forty after an operation in Rosario, thirty people in Pomabamba, forty commissioners of the 
various People’s Committees in Vinchos.6  By May the Army had established approximately 
fifty counterguerrilla bases of one hundred men each in the emergency zone.  These soldiers 
conducted aggressive patrols, attempted to maintain a constant presence in the villages and 
searched for insurgents.   
Despite the increasing death tolls, there were signs of progress.  President Belaúnde 
placed General Adrian Huaman Centero in command of the emergency zone in January 1984.  
General Centero improved conditions by enforcing moral behavior within the ranks, which 
resulted in fewer reported abuses.  He also initiated several small-scale development projects 
and met with local civilian leaders on a daily basis to address their grievances.  This shift in 
focus from counterguerrilla operations to a broad counterinsurgency effort caused the 
population to actively support the military – but the support lasted only as long as the military 
was present.  In most cases, the population supported whoever appeared in their villages, 
whether government forces or rebels.  
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Police intelligence efforts in the urban areas also showed results in 1984 with the first 
arrest of a major Sendero leader.  Counterterrorist units found it extremely difficult to 
penetrate Sendero cells because of the nature of the insurgent indoctrination program.  
Newcomers to the group were isolated and knew only their fellow cell members.  Only the 
cell leader had contact with Senderistas outside the cell.  Therefore, government intelligence 
operatives gathered most of their information from citizens who overheard insurgents 
discussing operations and possessed enough courage to come forward.  Despite these 
difficulties, in July 1984, the police were able to arrest Laura Zambrano Padilla, the political 
commander of the Lima Metropolitan Regional Committee and director of the group’s local 
activities since 1982.7   
As a component of its counterinsurgency efforts, the government conducted effective 
information operations to amplify its successes.  Starting with Padilla, the police routinely 
paraded the captured leaders in front of the media to be broadcast across Peru.  The state 
included anti-Sendero themes and messages with the broadcast to show the futility of the 
rebellion and the fate of those who joined.  This practice not only garnered support for the 
government, it influenced many against siding with the rebels.  The counterinsurgency 
operations were improving conditions in the emergency zone, but they also spread the turmoil 
to other departments of Peru as the rebels looked to establish new base areas away from 
military influence.   One of the new areas was the Upper Huallaga Valley, where Sendero 
Luminoso first appeared in May.8 
The government’s counterinsurgency campaign forced the leaders of Sendero 
Luminoso to look at alternate means to resource their operations.  The Upper Hualluga Valley 
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(UHV) region to the north of the emergency zone provided the solution.  The UHV is Peru’s 
richest coca-producing region and was central to the cocaine trade.  Under pressure from the 
United States, Peru was conducting widespread coca eradication efforts in the UHV, which 
deprived farmers of their only source of income and drove them to Sendero for support.  The 
insurgents protected the farmers and their crops from poorly equipped counter-narcotics 
forces and in return received a large payoff from the drug cartels.  The rebels also provided 
protection to the transporters of the coca leaves as they took the crops into Columbia and 
Bolivia for further processing.  The counter-narcotics efforts not only provided the insurgents 
funding for increased operations, it cost the government critical popular support.  A Peruvian 
general aptly summed up the dilemma:  “We have to have popular support to fight terrorism – 
we have to be a friend of the population, and you can’t do that by eradicating coca.”9   
By May 1984, the government had added the Upper Huallaga Valley to the emergency 
zone.  Most activity centered on Sendero clashes with counter-narcotics police.  In contrast to 
their efforts in Ayacucho, the insurgents moved into many of the villages and murdered local 
officials who did not agree to serve with them.  Other officials resigned after receiving death 
threats.     
As a result, the military commanders ordered counter-narcotics efforts halted in the 
UHV and allowed farmers to resume coca cultivation.  Almost immediately, this paid 
dividends as locals began providing intelligence on Sendero activities.  Acting off this new 
information, military units successfully trapped several Sendero patrols in the area, but failed 
to capture them.  Nonetheless, this operation severely curtailed Sendero activity in the UHV.  
The Army continued patrolling in the region, forcing many of the insurgents to flee into 
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adjacent areas where they could conduct only sporadic attacks against poorly defended police 
outposts.  The halt to coca eradication brought renewed pressure from the United States, 
which withdrew aid to Peru. 
In response to the spreading violence and increasing threat from Sendero Luminoso, 
President Belaúnde granted expanded counterterrorist powers to the military across much of 
Peru.  Essentially, the military could act almost at will, without any consideration for civil 
rights or due process.  The police still had jurisdiction over Lima, but they failed to show 
visible progress.  Despite the arrest of Padilla in July, Sendero forces continued to carry out 
attacks on financial institutions and security forces throughout the city, leading Belaúnde to 
add it to the military controlled zone.10  The military was chasing Sendero, it seemed, all over 
Peru, but could not deliver the decisive blow.  The Belaúnde administration focused almost 
entirely on military operations, to the detriment of any civic programs that might improve the 
lives of the peasants.  The only thing that limited the spread of Sendero support was the 
rebels’ own atrocities against those who did not willingly assist them.   
At the same time, the Belaúnde administration experienced the first of several major 
scandals that signaled trouble ahead.  Jaime Ayala, a news reporter, went missing in August 
1984, along with six members of a Protestant evangelical church in Callqui.  Many peasants 
in the area blamed the government forces for their disappearance, and the military, in turn, 
blamed Sendero Luminoso.  The media also discovered several clandestine mass graves near 
Huanta.  Belaúnde denied that the security services were responsible and blamed the media 
for spreading misinformation, while Army leaders claimed that Sendero Luminoso carried off 
their dead after battles and buried them in these graves.  Government experts identified the 
bodies and discovered that many of the victims were people previously reported as 
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“disappeared.”  They also reported that the victims were males, aged between seventeen and 
forty, and disfigured to hinder identification.  The victims were bound and blindfolded and 
killed by a variety of means.  The manner of death did not indicate rebels killed in a firefight 
with the military, but executions.  Public reaction was one of uniform horror. 
At the close of 1984, Sendero Luminoso attempted to disrupt the national elections in 
which Belaúnde ran for reelection against Alan Garcia, the Aprista candidate.  In October, the 
rebels set fire to several electoral offices in villages across Peru.  They then attacked two 
offices of the National Election Board in Ayacucho and Lima and burned the voting rolls.  
The rebels also attacked the registration centers in the central Peruvian towns of Jivia and 
Jesus, killing twelve government officials in the process.  The Civil Guard finally moved to 
secure the election offices and in doing so made several arrests.  This protective measure 
immediately curtailed Sendero attacks on the electoral offices and influenced the government 
to take additional measures.11   
As the elections grew closer in early 1985, Belaúnde increased the military presence in 
the emergency zone, sending between 5,000 and 7,000 soldiers into the southern highlands.  
He also sent an additional 2,500-3,000 soldiers in the northern highlands and UHV.  In all, 
over 10 percent of the Army participated in active operations against the rebels.12  Additional 
security forces were maintaining static security positions on key infrastructure.  On election 
day, the army had nearly 40,000 additional troops at approximately 4,000 polling stations 
throughout the country, thwarting Sendero Luminoso’s attempts to ruin the election.13   
Security forces had done well in controlling the group in Ayacucho and other areas in 
the southern Sierra.  This was mainly due to the counterinsurgency bases established the 
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previous May and aggressive patrolling over the past year.  The community self-defense 
groups (rondas campesinos) and the initiation of small-scale development projects was 
particularly effective.  Sendero’s mobility and well-established support network allowed it to 
avoid a crippling blow, but it could no longer completely dominate any region and was on the 
defensive.  Its recourse to savage terrorism, which included the massacre of entire villages to 
deter the population from cooperating with the government, reflected its weakened position.  
Sendero’s effectiveness in the UHV was limited due to the lack of established networks and 
advanced preparation, such as they had in Ayacucho.  Swift military action also hindered the 
insurgents in that area.  But the counter-narcotics efforts prevented the total elimination of 
Sendero in the UHV.     
The actions by the security forces hindered the insurgency in Lima, resulting in the 
arrest of several urban commanders in mid-1984, but the rebels still managed a few successful 
operations during the elections, such as the bombing of two of the political party headquarters 
and the assassination of several police officers.  Unlike activities in the highlands, operations 
in Lima attracted widespread media attention and enhanced Sendero Luminoso’s image as a 
major force. The Belaúnde administration attempted to counter this negative publicity by 
placing captured Sendero leaders on national television to admit their guilt.  This could not 
counter the negative publicity, however, and the population lost confidence with the 
authorities’ ability to maintain order in Lima.     
Despite limiting Sendero to a Phase I or II insurgency, the military under President 
Belaúnde never delivered the decisive blow.  The insurgents continued to attack isolated Civil 
Guard posts, peasant self-defense groups, and vulnerable policemen in the cities.  The cyclical 
nature of Sendero’s operations (high activity followed by recruiting and planning) allowed 
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them to remain a formidable force.  The insurgents’ ability to resupply themselves by theft or 
attacks made them virtually invulnerable to interdiction efforts.  Still, Guzmán’s goal of a 
nationwide revolution appeared remote.  Sendero lost the momentum it had early in 1980-
1982, but continuing economic difficulties provided it with endless opportunities.  Until the 
government improved the social and economic conditions that had caused the rebellion in the 
first place, Sendero Luminoso would remain a problem.   
It was no surprise when President Belaúnde lost the election.  Sendero Luminoso 
could claim a victory of sorts in the electoral defeat of Belaúnde.  Some experts considered 
the Belaúnde government “one of the worst governments Peru ever had.”14  During his 
administration, the country had suffered economic decline and ever-escalating violence.  The 
people were simply tired of the Dirty War that they suffered under the Belaúnde 
administration. 
The new president, Alan Garcia was the first member of APRA to actually take office 
without military intervention.  But relations between Garcia and the military were strained 
from the beginning.  Garcia had based his campaign on a populist platform, promising a 
domestic stimulus package and rejection of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) policies 
that many believed had crippled the economy.   Like his predecessors, he would have to deal 
with massive social and economics problems, ones that Sendero Luminoso would actively 
continue to exploit.     
 After his July 1985 inauguration, President Garcia quickly raised human rights 
standards in the security forces.  He fired three top generals associated with atrocities and 
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instituted training programs to better civil-military relations.15  He also passed the Law of 
Political-Military Commands which established a legal basis for political-military commands 
in the Emergency Zone and placed them under the control of the National Defense Council.16  
This council consisted of four military officers, including the commanders of the services and 
four civilians, including the president, and was responsible for oversight of counterinsurgency 
planning.  It was hoped this organization would make the military more responsive to civilian 
control and thus more likely to demonstrate better human rights practices.   
However, the cycle of violence between Sendero and the security forces caused 
problems for Garcia from the outset.  Only four months into his presidency, a major scandal 
broke when the media reported that nearly seventy-five civilians from the village of 
Accomarca had been massacred in August.17  In a familiar scenario, the media, along with 
many of the local villagers, blamed military patrols for the massacre.  The military, in turn, 
blamed Sendero Luminoso.  Garcia promised that he would rein in the military and stop such 
atrocities and the people looked to him to take swift action.  He ordered the congress to 
investigate the incident and after several weeks it determined that, in fact, a company 
operating from a counterinsurgency base near the village had committed the atrocity.  At the 
same time and not knowing the results of this investigation, the regional commander, General 
Jarama testified before the congressional commission, insisting that his units had not been 
involved.  Upon learning of the testimony, Garcia called a meeting of the National Defense 
Council and ordered Generals Jarama and Mori, another Emergency Zone commander, to 
attend.  At the meeting, the chief executive criticized the military’s human rights record as 
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well as its performance in counterguerrilla operations in the Emergency Zone.  No senior 
military representatives defended the two generals, and Garcia ordered them retired without 
benefits.  He also dismissed General Cesar Enrico, the Chairman of the Joint Command.   
As news of the meeting spread, many in the military feared that Garcia was starting a 
purge of military leaders over suspected human rights abuses.18  To the public, it appeared 
that Garcia was openly confronting the military leadership, an unheard of practice among 
chief executives.  In reality, he previously reached an understanding with the military that he 
would not prosecute old cases, but would deal harshly with any new abuses.  He also allowed 
all military personnel to be tried in military tribunals to avoid civilian courts and lengthy 
prison sentences.19  This gave Garcia a visible public boost early in his presidency, while also 
providing him with important support from the military leadership.     
The military command followed Garcia’s action by curtailing the activity of the 
counterguerrilla units, having them reduce the number and intensity of patrols and remain 
near their garrisons.  The cutback in activity meant much lower levels of interaction between 
the military and the populace and had the positive effect of lowering the number of civilian 
deaths, which dropped from 1,721 in 1984 to under 500 in 1985.20  Additionally, the number 
of disappearances dropped from an average of 880 per year during 1983 and 1984 to 205.  
The lowered activity also meant fewer restrictions on civil rights and more freedom of 
movement for villagers – and resulted in increased Sendero activity. 
  In December, rebels conducted a series of dynamite attacks in Lima to mark 
Guzmán’s 51st birthday.  The insurgents attacked the house of the founder of APRA, as well 
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as ten banks, a shopping center, eight electrical towers, a judicial office, and other sites 
causing minimal damage and no injuries.21  Just a few months later, in May 1986, a Sendero 
squad assassinated a Peruvian rear admiral in Lima, the highest ranking officer killed to date 
and the exclamation point on an increasing level of activity.22   
By mid-year, Sendero was once again executing strikes across Peru and appeared to be 
preparing for a major event.  This occurred in June when rioting Senderista inmates took over 
Lurigancho, Santa Barbara, and El Fronton prisons.  Immediately after learning of the 
incident, President Garcia ordered the military to reestablish control of the prisons.  After a 
short standoff, security forces raided all three prisons and restored order, but killed over 240 
inmates, including all the prisoners at Lurigancho prison, who reportedly surrendered prior to 
the raid.23   
President Garcia was shocked at the casualties his police and military forces had 
inflicted and quickly ordered investigations by both Congress and his attorney general.  
Tensions again rose considerably among the military leaders over a feared purge.  Within a 
week of the massacres the initial investigation revealed that the Republican Guard police 
force was behind the raid at Lurigancho prison.  Garcia announced that fifteen police officers 
and eighty policemen would stand trial, while commending the actions of the army.  
Additionally, the investigation revealed that the military executed the raids at the other two 
prisons, but with only a few casualties at Santa Barbara and only thirty-five at El Fronton.  
The military thus appeared to be absolved of wrongdoing, but many politicians criticized the 
findings and the government’s investigation.   
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Garcia again demonstrated political maneuvering by voicing concerns publicly, while 
making private agreements.  By June 28, the chief executive was publicly lashing out at the 
police forces and military over human rights abuses.  He later met privately with top military 
leaders for several hours however, and appeared to calm the situation.  Minister of Justice 
Gonzales Posada resigned over the incident, fearful because of terrorist threats against his 
family.24  The president later announced during a press conference that the military had acted 
appropriately during the raids and the incident had a positive aspect because a great number of 
terrorists had been eliminated.  He also stated that Peruvians would have to learn to live with 
heightened levels of violence.25  Garcia later formed a national council on human rights to 
provide oversight on human rights abuse cases and make recommendations on upholding 
laws.  Despite the prison incident he remained extremely popular with a 75 percent approval 
rating.26 
 The state then began an active period of initiatives to maintain high public opinion 
while maintaining pressure on the insurgents.  One of Garcia’s key steps was the 
reorganization of the military and police in April 1987.  The government created the Ministry 
of Defense to oversee the three military services.27  The new ministry consisted of the 
combined chiefs of the armed forces and a National Defense Secretariat of retired generals.  
For the police, the administration placed the three police divisions under a new organization, 
the National Police, under the control of the Ministry of the Interior.  In the new organization, 
the Civil Guard was renamed the General Police, the Republican Guard became the Security 
Police and the Intelligence Police became the Technical Police.  The government also created 
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a new police intelligence unit called DINCOTE.  Garcia pushed these reforms in order to 
unify command of the police and military and further enhance civilian control of these 
entities.  Previously, each separate service and police division reported directly to the chief 
executive.  The reorganization reduced the span of control to the two ministries.  President 
Garcia also hoped the new unified commands would improve communication and 
synchronization of the forces, while eliminating redundant tasks. 
His new Justice Minister, Carlos Blancas, announced another administration initiative 
in September.  The plan called for Senderistas to lay down their arms and open negotiations 
with the government.  The arrangement also offered amnesty to any Senderista who turned 
himself in and provided intelligence on the organization.  The amnesty program proved to be 
an effective intelligence-gathering tool.  The call for talks, however, was rejected by Guzmán 
and used as a propaganda point that Sendero Luminoso was winning the People’s War.   
The Garcia administration also launched an ambitious development program in the 
Emergency Zone, focusing on roads, schools, and health clinics.  The number of projects 
increased five-fold over the previous year.28  The government also extended credit to peasants 
at low rates and created short-term public employment projects.  Naturally, this encouraged 
the peasants in the highlands, many of whom never had seen any government support.  
Additionally, the local military commanders ensured that their soldiers behaved better when 
among the people.  The commanders themselves communicated daily with the local leaders 
and many of them spoke Quechua.  These factors combined with the Senderista violence 
against the local farmers, all contributed to increasing support for the government.  Locals 
even openly informed the military of Sendero activities.29 
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 Garcia’s counterinsurgency efforts led to a sharp decline in Sendero activity in 
early 1987.  The government continued to pursue the Senderistas throughout the Emergency 
Zone, which had shrunk to Ayacucho, Apurimac, and Huancavelica Departments.  General 
Jorge Sanchez Manrique commanded the forces in the Emergency Zone, which continued 
active patrolling from the many counterguerrilla bases that dotted the countryside.  The 
general also increased support to the Rondas Campesinos, which were becoming an 
increasingly effective tool.  The few attacks Sendero carried out were outside the Emergency 
Zone to the north in Junin Department or to the east in Cusco and Puno Departments.   
Discovering that they had an opportunity outside the Emergency Zone, Sendero began 
to pick up activity in these lightly patrolled areas.  The insurgents also renewed attacks 
against foreign businesses in Lima including the Bank of Tokyo and Chase Manhattan.30  The 
rebels also harassed development project workers and any military units that appeared 
vulnerable.  The Senderistas were careful to not become decisively engaged and appeared to 
be testing the military in many areas looking for a weak point or perhaps disguising their true 
intentions.   
They found their target when in May, they launched a major attack against a police 
station in the UHV near the town of Santa Lucia.  Nearly 200 insurgents moving in three 
columns converged on the isolated police post in an attack that lasted several hours.  The 
police called for help from a nearby military garrison, but no soldiers responded.  Many of the 
police fled, and the rebels killed all who fell into their hands.  The Senderistas controlled the 
town of Santa Lucia for over twenty-four hours until the Army moved into the area, and then 
the insurgents withdrew.  This event signaled a renewed burst of activity from Sendero, 
mostly in the UHV, including bombings of a hydroelectric plant, mortar attacks, and 
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assassinations.  The insurgents often attacked the power grid which left areas of Peru without 
power for days at a time and disrupted industrial activity.31  One dramatic example was 
Sendero’s attack on the Lima power grid on New Year’s Eve that blacked out the city for 
several days.  The strike was well timed to occur exactly at midnight.  
 The insurgents also intensified their intimidation against people who cooperated with 
the government.  No one was safe – rebels killed several civilians including a six year old 
child in Cayumbo for providing assistance to the police in the area.32  They killed twenty-six 
peasants returning to their village from a government-sponsored fair near Ayacucho.  The 
insurgents also stabbed two civilians in a people’s trial in a village square for cooperating 
with the government.     
 The new Sendero activity was costing the government millions of dollars.  This, as 
well as the increased spending on public works projects, heightened the already troubled 
economic situation and forced President Garcia to take drastic measures.  In June 1987, he 
nationalized foreign banks in an effort to gain currency.  This generated vehement protests 
from abroad and the IMF cut-off funds to Peru.  The end result was the start of a three year 
economic slide.  By the end of 1987 the economy started to suffer from hyperinflation.  By 
March 1988, inflation was climbing over 1,000 percent.33  This situation brought the 
government public works projects to an abrupt halt and severely limited most support to the 
peasants.    
Sendero Luminoso capitalized on this weakened economic situation by increasing its 
activity, moving once again into Phase II insurgency.  With a new wave of attacks, the group 
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was causing destruction throughout the country.  The insurgents bombed nine businesses and 
government offices in Huancayo on February 10.  They burned the government offices 
outside Tocache Nuevo only three days later.34  They also killed a judge and a local official 
from Incaracay and continued to murder civilians who cooperated with the government.  In 
one incident in Ayacucho, they killed forty-six peasants who failed to provide support.  
Although these assaults occurred all over south central Peru, the focus of the activity 
was in the UHV.  In February, the insurgents ambushed two army convoys, killing eighteen 
soldiers and wounding sixteen more.  They also attacked several police buses in May resulting 
in seventeen dead and thirty-three wounded.  Sendero also increased raids against local 
mining companies in order to acquire more explosive material.   At one point Sendero 
stormed the government controlled mining company CENTROMIN near Cerro de Pasco three 
times in less than ten days.35  
The group also began to demonstrate behavior proving it was a force on the rise and 
seeking to generate additional support from abroad.  On several occasions, the rebels became 
emboldened enough to openly participate in legal political rallies.  Additionally, several 
Senderistas lectured at universities in neighboring countries.  Sendero also joined a group 
called the Revolutionary International Movement – a small European based international 
organization of groups with Marxist, Leninist, Maoist ideologies.36   
The government did score one major success.  On June 12, the police arrested the 
group’s second in command, Osman Morote.37  The arrest provided a needed boost to the 
government and the public’s perception of the police.  Besides being Guzmán’s chief 
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lieutenant, Morote also served as the military commander of the Huancavelica zone, although 
he recently moved into the UHV to reorganize forces in that critical area.  Morote was a 
member of the central committee and a key strategist of the People’s Guerrilla Army.  
Although his capture generated much excitement, the compartmental nature of Sendero 
prevented any major security breach 
The government was unable to capitalize on this key arrest as Morote was acquitted of 
the charges brought against him only a month later.  The acquittal enraged the public and 
most people suspected the judges had been bought off or intimidated into the acquittal.  Many 
criminal judges admitted that they feared for their lives and those of their families when 
dealing with Sendero cases.  Garcia promised the public that Morote would not go free and 
the government presented additional charges against him.  The president also pledged to 
present new anti-terror laws to congress within the year.38  Only days later, a vigilante group 
calling itself the Rodrigo Franco Democratic Command killed Morote’s attorney.  Sendero 
claimed the group was sponsored by the government and vowed revenge. 
The insurgents continued to gain strength as the nation moved toward national 
elections in 1989.  The rebels killed almost indiscriminately, targeting any group or individual 
that wasn’t Sendero.  The scale of the attacks seemed to be increasing, especially against the 
civilians.  In particular, the violence between Sendero and the Rondas Campesinos escalated 
in villages across Peru.  In one incident, Sendero killed 39 peasants in Ayacucho as the 
peasants prepared for a patrol.  Many of the Rondas scored successful hits on Sendero as well.       
Equally serious as the Sendero threat, the economic problems were quickly reaching 
disaster status.  Inflation rose to nearly 7,500 percent.39  Support for President Garcia’s party 
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(APRA) eroded.  The chief executive’s economic policies proved disastrous and drove 
millions to the illegal economy.  The only real wages that could be earned were in coca 
production and Sendero secured most of the coca production in the UHV.  The group also 
continued to gain funds through extortion from companies and bank robberies.  
In a final effort to help Peru’s collapsing economy, Garcia pledged to cooperate with 
the United States counter-narcotics effort, which brought in an influx of aid dollars.  Starting 
at the end of 1989, he also allowed U.S. Special Forces Mobile Training Teams into Peru to 
assist and advise the Peruvian military in counterinsurgency operations.  At least three teams 
conducted training in base defense and interdiction techniques.  In February 1990, The United 
States and Peru signed an exchange of notes on extradition of drug traffickers, a major victory 
for the United States in the War on Drugs.40  The exchange confirmed explicitly that persons 
charged with narcotics trafficking and related drug offenses were subject to extradition to the 
United States for trial.     
Despite the stronger ties, President Garcia could not overcome the economic problems 
and Sendero threat.  A relatively unknown political outsider and former mathematician, 
Alberto Fujimori, won the national election, perhaps because he was an outsider.  The people 
were certainly ready for a change.  The past two administrations had failed to deliver on their 
promises.  The economy was worse than ever.  The insurgency was growing and seemed 
stronger than at any time since 1982.  The people were willing to do almost anything to 
reverse the negative trends in Peru. 
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CHAPTER 5  FUJIMORI COUNTERINSURGENCY (1990-2000) 
 
As Fujimori took office, Sendero Luminoso numbered close to 25,000 militants and 
controlled about one-fourth of all municipalities, but more significantly, it undermined the moral, 
social, and political order of Peru.1  The new president had developed a comprehensive 
counterinsurgency strategy to defeat Sendero, but the insurgency was not his only concern.  The 
president also inherited an economy suffering from hyperinflation and cut-off from international 
aid, as well as a restive population looking to the government to improve their lives.  The chief 
executive introduced “Fujishock”, a series of austerity measures designed to bring the economy 
under control and return foreign aid and investment.  In addition, he was now responsible for a 
government and military facing numerous charges of corruption.  Fujimori purged the military 
leadership in order to place loyalists in position to carry out his programs.  The president focused 
on economic and government issues to strengthen his position, even at the expense of allowing 
Sendero to grow, before launching his counterinsurgency.  Eventually, he assumed absolute 
control of the country in a self-coup in order to push through his anti-terror initiatives.  Although 
many decried his actions, Fujimori was able to capture Guzman and all but destroy Sendero 
Luminoso; by the end of the 1990’s only a handful of rebels remained.    
  
The chief executive had learned from watching previous administrations that he had to gain 
firm control over the military.  He had observed how the Belaúnde administration operated in 
fear of the military and the Garcia administration lost control of it and faced continual human 
rights scandals.  Fujimori wanted the military to answer to him and him alone.  In order to direct 
the military, the president turned to his most trusted advisor Vladimiro Montesinos.  Montesinos 
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suggested which generals the commander in chief should retire, which ones to promote, and 
which to place in key posts.2  Together they developed a plan to purge the armed forces of 
possible opponents and lay the basis for tighter control of the high command. 
Almost immediately after taking office, Fujimori relieved the commander of the Navy and 
his intelligence chief for actively opposing his candidacy during the presidential campaign.  He 
also replaced the top two Air Force commanders, who had a history of working against each 
other in order to gain power, with loyalist officers. Fujimori promulgated Decree Law No. 752 in 
November 1991 which allowed him to appoint the military commanders from among the senior-
ranking generals and allowed the appointed officers to remain at their posts indefinitely.3  
Previously, the senior-ranking general had assumed the command of the armed forces when the 
previous general retired and officers serving in other senior leadership positions served only for 
one year before rotating out.  Armed with his new legislation, he made General Nicolas Hermoza 
Rios, another loyalists officer recommended by Montesinos, the Army commander. He then 
placed the Ministries of Defense and Interior under the SIN.  This move effectively placed 
Vladimiro Montesinos as the director of intelligence, the national police, and the military.  With 
Hermoza now in place indefinitely, the president began appointing other reliable officers to key 
positions and further reorganizing the military.  With all the military service commanders 
personally appointed by Fujimori, he had co-opted the military leadership and established firm 
control. 
To improve Peru’s economy, the president launched immediate austerity programs and began 
repayment of debts in coordination with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.  Both 
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measures brought instant international approval and increased aid.  Foreign investors now 
viewed Peru as a more stable and favorable environment for investment.  By December 1990, 
Fujimori was making progress with the economic situation in Peru.  His administration’s 
adherence to IMF measures dropped inflation from 400 to 10 percent.  However, the austerity 
measures were also sparking labor unrest which bolstered Sendero’s ability to recruit in Lima. 
The administration increased cooperation with the United States in the areas of counter-
narcotics and intelligence-gathering.  One of the most notable examples was the involvement of 
the CIA with the counter-terrorism intelligence agency of the Peruvian National Police, 
DINCOTE, Benedicto Jiminez of DINCOTE approached his superiors and the CIA agents about 
forming his own special cell to track down Sendero leaders.  Jiminez was appalled by standard 
DINCOTE techniques which involved torture and other abuses of power, and wanted to follow 
more traditional investigative techniques.  His leaders were skeptical, but approved his proposal 
and gave him a small budget and four agents.  The CIA station chief in Lima took a wait-and-see 
approach out of concern about becoming involved in another human rights scandal.4  In June 
1990 Jiminez’ group raided a major Sendero safe house in Lima, capturing several mid-level 
leaders.  As a result of the successful raid, the CIA provided additional assistance to this group, 
including video equipment to use on stakeouts. 
With this added help, Jiminez and his cell in March captured key Sendero Luminoso 
documents and videos in Lima, proving that Sendero leader Abimael Guzmán was still alive.  
Using techniques learned from the American agents, Jiminez also identified the Sendero logistics 
and financial chief for Lima and began tailing him.  After weeks of painstaking observation this 
operative led them to other Sendero cadres.  As a result of Jiminez’ success, the CIA also 
established a training program at DINCOTE headquarters.  Although the DINCOTE operators 
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were effective in gathering information, they did not have the technology and skills to develop 
the information into actionable intelligence and exploit it.  The CIA focused its training program 
on developing exploitable intelligence information and began training the Peruvian detectives 
how to analyze, cross-reference, and classify documents.  The CIA mentors, along with an expert 
from Scotland Yard, also taught the Peruvians better surveillance techniques.  The CIA provided 
high-powered optics, telephoto cameras, listening devices, night vision goggles and vehicles, as 
well as money for general operating expenses.  By July, Jiminez’ group had expanded to about 
eighty-two personnel.5 
The Drug Enforcement Agency also intensified its cooperation with Peru, assisting the 
Peruvian Air Force to interdict drug flights into Colombia. Many in Peru resented the pressure 
the U.S. placed on Latin American countries, including Peru, over the counter-narcotics effort.  
The U.S. tied much of its aid to counter-narcotics performance measures.  Many also criticized 
the fact that crop-eradication efforts did not provide replacement crops to help peasants earn 
income.  The Peruvian military refused to participate in counter-narcotics operations because of 
the many demands by the U.S.  Even President Fujimori worked toward trying to remove 
performance conditions from economic and military aid with U.S.6 
In response to increased foreign presence, Sendero Luminoso stepped up its violence against 
foreigners.  In August 1990, for example, it attacked and killed two Mormon missionaries near 
Huancayo.  A handwritten note left near the bodies demanded that all “Yankee invaders” leave 
Peru.  It also detonated several car bombs the same week in Lima, including one that targeted the 
Mexican embassy, and one near the presidential palace on August 13.7  In October, Sendero 
assassinated a prominent human rights activist and also detonated a bomb near the wall that 
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surrounded the German embassy in Lima.8 On December 10, Sendero killed seven Peruvian 
residents and destroyed all the equipment and facilities at an exploration camp of Mobil Oil at 
Barranco in the UHV.  It also detonated four explosive devices in Lima aimed at the Soviet, 
Japanese, and American Embassies.9    
  By the start of 1991, Sendero was a major force in Peru, operating with increasing freedom 
of movement and effectively attacking targets at will.   Although Sendero continued to avoid 
large-scale firefights with military units, it attacked smaller military forces and outposts and most 
police units.  By most criteria, Sendero Luminoso was a Phase III Insurgency.  It posed such a 
threat that senior officials in the George H. W. Bush administration feared that it might be able to 
seize power.  Bernard Aronson, the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, was 
especially alarmed, comparing Sendero Luminoso to the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia.10  He was 
one of the primary proponents of increased CIA assistance to Peru.    
By August, Sendero Luminoso’s continuing campaign against foreigners was having an 
effect.  The group appeared to specifically attack Japanese targets, possibly because of 
Fujimori’s Japanese descent.  In mid-July, Sendero killed three Japanese aid workers near Huaral 
and a Peruvian-Japanese businessman in Lima.  Japan withdrew all of its aid workers from Peru 
in response.  Sendero also attacked and killed a Canadian aid worker and an Australian nun.   
The Fujimori administration seemed powerless to prevent the attacks.  The president advised 
foreigners residing in rural Peru to evacuate areas of guerrilla activities and move to urban 
centers, such as Lima.11  Although this act undoubtedly saved the lives of more aid workers, it 
also prevented the people who needed aid from receiving it and confirmed their feeling that the 
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government did not care for them.  It also emboldened the insurgents and increased their belief 
that if they caused enough death and damage, the government and its supporters would withdraw 
or quit.     
As always, several reports appeared charging the government with corruption and abuse.  
The first charge to be raised against the Fujimori administration occurred in December 1990 
when counter-narcotics police made allegations against the army concerning narcotics 
corruption.  The army, in turn, denied the police access to the UHV, which hindered their efforts.  
The charges specifically named General Oswaldo Hanke, commander of the UHV military 
region.   
In another incident in November 1991, the media accused the army of killing five human 
rights and legal workers in the central Sierra.  This, once again, placed the military at odds with 
the president and his campaign promise to protect civil liberties.  Human rights groups claimed 
that nearly 111 workers ‘disappeared’ in 1991 and blamed the army for most of the 
disappearances.12  In the media, Fujimori pledged to prosecute any offenses, but just as Belaúnde 
and Garcia had been forced to do, in private he had to negotiate with military leaders out of the 
fear of a possible coup.   
Antiterrorist death squads also reappeared at the end of 1991.  These groups carried out 
several attacks against persons with suspected ties to Sendero or involved with prosecuting 
human rights abusers in the military.  Most indications pointed to the Rodrigo Franco Command, 
a vigilante group that had close ties to the police during the Garcia administration.  The group 
was also suspected of committing two notable attacks in Lima.  One, a raid on a party in the slum 
of Barrios Altos, resulted in seventeen deaths, the other fourteen in a small village outside of 
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Lima.  What was notable was that in both attacks, nearby police stations failed to respond and 
then conducted unhurried investigations that opened them to charges of collusion.13 
Despite these problems, by early 1992, Fujimori was satisfied that he had established 
firm control of the government.  The Peruvian economy was much improved and despite 
Sendero activities, foreign investment was returning.  The improvement of relations with the 
United States had brought a resumption of American aid.  He was solidly in control of the 
military and enjoyed more domestic control than any chief executive since before the Velasco 
coup in 1968.  He could now turn his full attention to destroying the insurgent threat.   
In contrast to Belaúnde and Garcia, Fujimori actually developed a national strategy to 
defeat the insurgency.  The centerpiece of this strategy was a series of laws designed to bolster 
the military’s control of the areas designated as emergency zones.   These laws also increased 
judicial powers over accused terrorists.  These measures included allowing suspected terrorists to 
be held for up to 15 days without being charged and allowed judges to remain anonymous when 
presiding over terrorism cases.  Many international human rights groups complained about the 
new measures and this international pressure influenced the congress as it debated the proposed 
legislation.   
Fujimori became impatient when the congress failed to approve or weakened many of his 
initiatives.  He also believed the judicial system was weak and corrupt.  Over the course of his 
presidency thus far, the courts had released nearly two hundred suspected rebels.14  Additionally, 
Fujimori had pressed the judicial branch to try Sendero Luminoso leader Abimael Guzmán in 
absentia.  This move drew criticism from many within and outside the government, including the 
rival APRA representatives such as former President Alan Garcia.  Despite common knowledge 
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in Peru of Guzmán’s role in Sendero, he was exonerated by the Supreme Court for lack of 
evidence.   
Fujimori reached the limit of his patience on April 6.  He ordered the military to deploy 
throughout Lima to prevent possible unrest, dissolved congress, disbanded the judiciary, and 
suspended the constitution, declaring a “national reconstruction” government.15  He also placed 
congressional leaders and former president Garcia under arrest on charges of corruption.  
Leaders from the armed forces and national police all issued statements in support of the 
president, which effectively prevented any significant protests.  The people of Peru stayed at 
home; most did not trust congress either so there was little protest.  Fujimori could now press on 
with his sweeping changes to fight the insurgency and with his economic recovery program.  He 
issued a statement that his cabinet would draft new laws and eventually hold a plebiscite on a 
new constitution.  For the time being, democracy was finished as Peru became the first South 
American country of the 1990’s to slip back into authoritarianism.  Many believed that civil 
rights were now on hold and human rights violations would rise.16 
The effect of President Fujimori’s power grab or auto-golpe as it was called in Peru, was 
to concentrate power in a triumvirate consisting of the President, Security Advisor Vladimiro 
Montesinos, and the Chairman of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, General Nicolas 
Hermoza Rios.  The military now controlled all security matters in Peru, which greatly increased 
the potential for abuse of power.  Naturally, with this sort of power structure there was little if 
any accountability or oversight of the military or intelligence network.  Methods no longer 
mattered, only results did.   
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 The leaders developed a two-pronged strategy to defeat the insurgency – one was a 
severe curtailment of freedom of movement and suspension of many civil rights, the other was to 
bolster the anti-Sendero mobilization of the people by civil patrols, the rondas campesinos first 
introduced by the Belaúnde administration.  In order to generate support, Fujimori tied 
government benefits for villages and departments to rondas activity and also provided the rondas 
with more modern arms and training.  As a result, by 1993 there were more than 4,000 rondas 
throughout Peru actively working to defeat Sendero Luminoso.   
In response to the auto-golpe, the United States cut off military and economic assistance, 
but, covert aid apparently continued, including CIA funds for the intelligence cell within 
DINCOTE that was still searching for Sendero leaders.  In June, the group arrested the Sendero 
logistics and financial chief.  Jiminez interrogated the individual and learned of several possible 
safe houses in Lima that Guzmán could be using.  Jiminez and his group established surveillance 
on them and carefully searched the trash carried out by the residents.  The searches from one of 
the houses turned up many items that indicated Guzmán’s presence, including psoriasis 
medicine, Absolut vodka bottles, and empty cartons of Winston Lights cigarettes.  On September 
14, Jiminez ordered a raid of the house which resulted in the capture of the elusive Sendero 
Luminoso chief.17   
This particular moment was a critical time for the intelligence services, the police, and 
the government of Peru.  Up to this time, many of Sendero’s leaders had been killed during their 
capture, either as a result of firefights with the military or while trying to escape.  Many believed 
that they had been murdered during the course of interrogations or simply executed at the time of 
capture.  Some intelligence officers reported Montesinos wanted Guzmán to meet the same fate.  
As a matter of fact, Montesinos personally had placed General Antonio Ketin Vidal as the head 
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of DINCOTE so Vidal could send him progress reports on the search for Guzmán.  Officers 
testified that he also wanted the general to have forces in place to kill the Sendero leader if he 
was captured.  But when Guzmán was arrested, Vidal did not follow Montesinos’ plan and 
instead paraded Guzmán in front of the media for all of Peru to see.  Montesinos reportedly was 
furious.18   
Guzmán’s capture was the turning point in the fight against Sendero Luminoso.  Guzmán 
was more than the head of the group; he was the spiritual bond that held the movement together.  
With his arrest, Sendero lost the guidance of “Gonzalo Thought,” those principles set forth by 
Guzmán.  The group could no longer claim to be the 4th sword of communism.  Naturally, 
Guzmán had deputies and a politburo, but Guzmán was Sendero, just as Osama bin Laden is Al 
Qaeda.  He had killed or discredited any who had grown too strong and the cronies who 
remained were left in charge and forced to take the group into the future.  Due to Sendero’s 
compartmentalized structure, many of these subordinate leaders did not even know each other.  
Undoubtedly, Guzmán’s fall left Sendero with a great power vacuum and severely limited.  Peru 
braced for Sendero’s response, expecting an onslaught of activity.  Although the leader was 
gone, the individual cells did not need to be told to strike.19   
President Fujimori’s approval rating increased from 56 to 73 percent after Guzmán’s 
capture and this increased his ability to manipulate the constituent congress and the judiciary.20  
He continued to use decree power to reform the judiciary and transferred jurisdiction of terrorism 
cases from civilian courts to military tribunals.  In doing so, he stated the need to respect the 
“popular will” of the people in handing down sentences to convicted terrorists.  This change also 
quickened the process of terrorism trials and all but guaranteed conviction and life sentencing.  
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Peru: A Hard Act to Follow, p. 5. 
20 United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Peru: Fujimori Riding Higher, p. 4. 
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He followed these decrees by promising Guzmán a fair trial and a harsh sentence that would be 
handed down by October 7.  Two of Guzmán’s subordinates were convicted and sentenced to life 
imprisonment days earlier.21   
By September 1993, Sendero was on the verge of collapse.  The group had taken nearly 
twelve years to reach its zenith, but after Guzmán’s arrest, only one year to fall apart.  It had not 
conducted any major attacks in almost a year and had experienced a series of high-level 
leadership arrests.  Then, in a surprise move, Guzmán issued several letters from prison in which 
the government claimed he called on his followers to lay down their arms and engage in peace 
talks with the authorities.  On 24 September, after nearly a year in captivity, Guzmán issued a 
statement that was known as the ‘speech from the cage.’22  Guzman stated: 
….[W]e are living historic moments, each of us must be clear that 
this is the case, let us not fool ourselves. In these moments we should 
mobilize all forces to confront difficulties and continue accomplishing our 
tasks and conquering our goals, successes and victory! That is what we 
must do.  We are here as children of the people and we are struggling in 
these trenches, it is also about combat, and we do it because we are 
Communists, because here we defend the interests of the people, the 
principles of the party, the People's War. That is why we do it, we are 
doing it and will continue to do it!  We are here in these circumstances. 
Some think this is a great defeat. They are dreaming and we tell them to 
keep on dreaming! It is simply a bend, nothing more, a bend in the road. 
The road is long and we shall arrive. We shall triumph. You shall see it. 
You shall see it….. [T]his is the situation, this is where they have brought 
us. But we have a fact, a Peruvian revolution, a people's war, and it is, and 
will continue to advance.23 
 
The government claimed Guzmán was calling for Sendero to lay down their arms and to 
seek peace.  There were even some within Sendero who felt this way.  Many of the insurgents 
were weary after over thirteen years of armed struggle.  Fujimori claimed that Guzmán had 
called for negotiations “to reach a peace accord to put an end to thirteen years of People’s 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ocasio, “Why the People’s War is Justified,” p. 1. 
23 Abimael Guzmán, “Speech fro the Cage.” 
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War.”24  Given the text of the speech, this is a dubious interpretation and was most likely made 
as part of the government’s propaganda campaign.  Guzmán’s message actually encouraged the 
insurgents to continue the fight.  The government propaganda created to a rift within Sendero, 
with some saying the difficulties were too great to continue and calling for a “fight for a peace 
accord.”25  The hardcore insurgents refuted this position and continued fighting.  Sendero now 
found itself back to a Phase I insurgency limited to random terrorist attacks.  In October, 
militants detonated a car bomb in the parking lot near the departure terminal at Lima’s 
international airport, injuring twenty persons and damaging the Americans Airlines cargo office.  
The next month, Sendero tossed a satchel charge in front of the U.S.-Peruvian Binational Center.   
One of the surprising losers of the Guzmán capture was the cell within DINCOTE headed 
by Jiminez.  Despite the success of the mission and the popularity of the group, Montesinos 
successfully dismantled the group that had captured Guzmán.  The leader of DINCOTE, Vidal, 
was promoted to the National Police, but, in reality, his new position had much less authority.  
Jiminez was shunted off to the Peruvian embassy in Panama as a police attaché.  Montesinos’ 
moves caused a debate within the CIA about whether to continue to provide assistance to Peru 
and with whom to coordinate.  CIA authorities did not want to deal with Montesinos because of 
his suspected ties to death squads, but many did not believe he was involved.  Eventually, the 
leaders concluded that Sendero had been defeated and that the agency should now focus on the 
war on drugs and that Montesinos was useful for that purpose.26   
To maintain momentum, in 1994, the Fujimori administration announced a new amnesty 
program to insurgents.  Any insurgents who turned themselves in and cooperated with the 
government would not face charges in military courts.  This initiative contributed to the drop in 
                                                 
24 Ibid, p. 2. 
25 Heriberto Ocasio, “Why the People’s War is Justified and Why it is the Road to Liberation,” p. 2. 
26 Lane, “Superman Meets Shining Path.” 
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violence in 1994.  Sendero killed only 150 persons, down from 516 in 1993.  The only incidents 
of note were a car bomb at Air Force Headquarters in February that killed two and a sabotage of 
several electrical towers in October, cutting off power temporarily in nearly all of Lima.  
Sendero struggled to survive.  The group had to recruit new members, rebuild and resolve its 
leadership problems.  Additionally, Sendero discovered that a coca plant fungus and a more 
aggressive government counter-narcotics policy had disrupted its financial support system in the 
UHV.   
 The decline continued in 1995.  What activity Sendero did generate was limited to 
isolated rural areas, mainly in the UHV as the group labored to maintain its financial network 
and to rebuild.  The police arrested many Senderistas prior to the national elections, preventing 
any attempt to disrupt the vote.  In a major coordinated operation, counterterrorist police arrested 
approximately twenty members of Sendero Luminoso in the cities of Lima, Callao, Huancayo, 
and Arequipa.  Among those captured was the number two leader and central committee member 
Margi Clavo Peralta, who later publicly announced her support for peace talks with the 
government.27   
 But the authorities suffered setbacks in the campaign against Sendero Luminoso.  In 
October a Sendero patrol attacked several army patrols near Aspuzana, killing fifteen soldiers.  
Many of the people in the nearby villages welcomed the Senderistas, but it is unclear whether 
their welcome was genuine or based on fear or convenience.  As a result of this and other attacks 
in the area, President Fujimori declared a state of emergency once again in the UHV.28   
Sendero once again reached out for meaningful external support, but the effort was in 
vain.  There were displays of sympathy, but little else.  In March, the London-based 
                                                 
27 United States, Department of State, 1995 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report. 
28 Luis Quispe, ed., “Peru: Reports in the press,” Peruvian Newsbriefs. 
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Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM) issued a call to “Rally to the Defense of our Red 
Flag Flying in Peru!”  RIM also stated its opposition to the call for a peace accord which would 
have “represented a compromise of the fundamental interests of the people and an abandonment 
of the People’s War and the revolutionary road.”29  This interest from abroad most likely came 
about by the influence of Senderistas who had fled to other countries.   Several groups 
sympathetic to Sendero Luminoso formed in various countries, during the course of the 
“People’s War,” including the United States.   
Despite the call for help, Sendero and the insurgency were all but finished.  Peru entered 
a period of relative calm and the Fujimori administration was riding a wave of popularity and 
prosperity (in Peruvian terms).  The only news involving Sendero Luminoso anymore was the 
occasional arrest of a Sendero leader, such as that of senior Sendero leader Elizabeth Cardenas, 
aka Comrade Aurora, in December.30  It appeared that President Fujimori could turn his focus 
from military matters and the insurgency to domestic and economic issues.   
Sendero disrupted this period of calm, when it made an unexpected attack across the 
south central highlands.  The insurgents attacked an army patrol in Santa Cruz, but were forced 
to withdraw.  Another group attacked the military base at Los Milagros, capturing and executing 
the officers.  More police surrendered after an attack in Huanuco.  A column of one-hundred 
Senderistas took over the city of San Miguel for twenty-four hours.  The attacks shocked the 
nation with their suddenness and ferocity.  What frightened most experts were the insurgents’ 
sophisticated command and control and ability to synchronize the multiple attacks in multiple 
areas.   
                                                 
29 Ocasio, “Why the People’s War is Justified,” p. 2. 
30 United States, Department Of State, 1996 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report.   
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These rebels caught the military unprepared.  Most of the counterinsurgency garrisons 
had settled into a routine.  They performed predictable patrols and were not really looking for 
signs of a Sendero resurgence.  The military spent most of November retraining and re-
establishing their patrols.  Highly trained and refocused, the army went into action in December, 
when the combined forces of the Special Operations Division of the Army and the special 
operations division of the National Police held at least four clashes with Sendero groups.  As a 
result of the new campaign, the security forces captured nearly fifteen rebels, among them four 
political-military commanders.  They also dismantled six Sendero popular committees in the 
UHV.  The security forces scored a key victory when they captured and destroyed a large 
quantity of war material and explosives in the San Jose Crespo Castillo District.31  The brief 
Sendero resurgence was finished.  
The security forces maintained the offensive into 1998.  On April 20, the police captured 
Pedro Domingo Quintero, the second-highest ranking Shining Path rebel, and Oscar Ramirez 
Durand’s right-hand man at a restaurant in Lima.  Quintero, a former teacher, had been the 
Shining Path’s ideological leader since Guzmán’s arrest.  With Durand, he mapped out the 
Shining Path’s military strategy.  Recently, he led Sendero’s recruitment campaigns, aimed at 
local youth.  President Fujimori claimed that Quintero’s capture was made possible due to a rare 
film of a high-level Sendero meeting obtained by the police in 1991.  The same film was used to 
arrest Guzmán.  Police interrogated Quintero which led to a raid on Lima shantytowns on April 
24 and the arrest of a local Sendero field leader, Alberto Ramirez, together with the head of 
operations, Maximo Anosa.32  The police also captured Rodolfo Condori, the group’s explosive 
expert as well as a large quantity of explosives.   
                                                 
31 Quispe, ed., “Peru: Reports in the Press.” 
32 “Shining Path Leaders Captured.”  
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By August 1998, a rift between the top three leaders of Peru forced President Fujimori to 
make a change in military leadership.  He dismissed General Hermoza as chairman of the joint 
command and appointed General Cesar Enrique Saucedo Sanchez, formerly the Interior Minister 
and man who commanded the forces that raided the Japanese Embassy after a takeover by 
terrorists.  General Julio Salazar Monroe, who was the head of the SIN, took over as defense 
minister.  Prior to the announcement, Montesinos ordered troops and tanks to occupy key 
positions in the capital in order to prevent a possible move by Hermoza to counter the dismissal.  
Montesinos was the clear winner in this move because it allowed him to consolidate control over 
the intelligence community and the military.  General Salazar was a noted Montesinos crony and 
willing to relinquish authority to Montesinos, as he did as head of SIN.   
Despite the shake-up, the military and police continued to score successes.  In July 1999, 
the military captured Durand after a two week sweep into Peru’s central jungle which included 
fighter jets, helicopters, and both ground and river troops.33  The combined force of military and 
police pinned him down to a remote area where the Amazon jungle merges with the Eastern 
slopes of the Andes.  President Fujimori traveled to Jauja to personally oversee the manhunt.  As 
a result of the arrest, and Sendero’s loss of another leader, the insurgents did not conduct any 
major attacks for the remainder of 1999.  However, clashes continued in the central and southern 
regions with soldiers pursuing two columns of 60-80 rebels, led by Comrade Alipio.34  
By 2000, the main effort against Sendero Luminoso was in the courts.  Several Sendero 
leaders were convicted and received sentences of thirty years to life in prison.   The military 
continued to round up remaining Sendero leaders, focusing on the UHV and Apurimac/Ene 
River Valley where the remnants of the insurgency remained.  Much of the successes resulted 
                                                 
33 “Peruvian Security Forces Capture Shining Path Leader.” 
34 United States, Department of State, 1999 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report. 
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from increased U.S anti-terrorism training and aid to the Peruvian forces.  By the end of the year, 
Sendero strength was estimated to be down to 100-200 militants.35  Additionally, Peru was 
cooperating fully with U.S. law enforcement including sharing intelligence and sharing access to 
databases.   
                                                 
35 United States, Department of State, 2000 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report. 
CHAPTER 6  CONCLUSION 
Sendero Luminoso or Shining Path was one of the most successful insurgent groups in 
the western hemisphere.  The group gained control of substantial portions of Peru through its 
violent insurgency.  It formed in the Andean highlands as a result of the dismal socioeconomic 
conditions, which created the prerequisites for an insurgency to develop:  (1) a vulnerable 
population hoping for change, (2) leaders available to direct the insurgency and (3) lack of 
government control.   
 The peasants of the Andean highlands lived for centuries in poverty.  Yet they never 
revolted against the government.  These people accepted their way of life and simply went about 
their business to survive.  They were all but ignored by successive governments of Peru.  Yet the 
Velasco coup in 1968 and the subsequent agrarian reform put the first glimmer of hope in their 
mind.  The government promised to address their needs and when the government failed to 
deliver, the peasants became susceptible to Sendero influence. 
 Of course, Abimael Guzmán Reynoso provided the needed leadership to propel Sendero 
Luminoso into action.  Guzmán had a vision of a self-sufficient utopian society for Peru and 
believed that only he could lead Peru to that goal and only through the People’s War could it get 
there.  Guzmán’s vision turned a group of students and peasants into one of the most lethal 
terrorist organizations in the world.  He was able to motivate this group to give up what little 
they had, to live voluntarily in harsh conditions, in some cases to learn a new language - all to 
create a bond with the people he claimed to want to help.  Guzmán provided direction to 
Sendero, personally leading the group from a band of untrained vandals carrying sling shots to a 





captured, Sendero rapidly declined to an almost insignificant force.  Guzmán’s leadership was 
Sendero Luminoso and without him Sendero Luminoso no longer existed. 
   Except for the short-lived attempt at agrarian reform in the early 1970’s by the Velasco 
regime, the government ignored the Sierra until Sendero Luminoso started its terror campaign in 
1980.  The peasants never showed signs of organizing against the government and because of the 
isolation provided by geography, it was easy for the government to disregard the region.  This 
lack of control or presence provided Guzmán the freedom of maneuver he needed to organize 
Sendero Luminoso.  He was able to transform the National University of San Cristobal of 
Huamanga into an insurgency incubator that created rebel leaders instead of educated peasants 
ready to use their knowledge to better their communities.  The cadres were able to move about 
the area freely, openly recruiting new members.   
 The peasants of the Andean highlands today still desire change, but recognize that the 
government is trying to provide the change.  Successive administrations attempted to address the 
needs of the peasants with varying results.  The government simply did not have the resources to 
address all the needs in a timely manner.  Yet after a quarter of a century of effort, progress has 
been made.  Conditions still provide the potential for mobilization against the government, but 
not to the extent that existed prior to 1980. 
 Leaders like Abimael Guzmán do not come along very often.  He was a rare force that 
could impose his will on a mass of people to make them do things that, when examined from the 
outside, seem strange or illogical.  Does the next Guzmán exist now in the Andean highlands?  It 
is highly doubtful, but that is a question that can only be answered if Sendero re-emerges to pose 





 The government established and maintained a continuous presence in the Sierra as a 
result of the Sendero rebellion.  This presence remains today.  Although the State may not be 
able to provide immediate change to the peasants, it maintains contact with them to show 
concern for their needs.  The police force, once one of the worst in Latin America, is now 
functional.  The military greatly improved its human rights record and many aid organizations 
operate throughout Peru.  The government maintains control throughout Peru.   
 Therefore, the prerequisites of an insurgency do not exist as they did prior to 1980.  The 
administration is addressing the population’s needs.  The government maintains contact with the 
people.  The military treats the people better.  The people see their lives slowly improving.  The 
only unknown variable is the leadership.  Is the next Guzmán out there? 
 Besides improving the conditions that exist within Peru, the government conducted an 
effective counterinsurgency campaign.  Many may argue that point but the end state supports the 
claim.  The method the government used to win was brutal at times with random violence 
committed against the people as well as the insurgents.  But by restricting civil rights, targeting 
the leadership, and conducting counterguerrilla operations, the government defeated Sendero 
Luminoso.  Counterinsurgencies by nature are lengthy campaigns.  Failing counterinsurgencies 
can drag out for decades and successful campaigns take many years because the insurgency is 
never defeated until the conditions that created the insurgency are improved.   
 The speed that the insurgency collapses militarily increases with restrictions on civil 
rights up to the maximum that the people will endure.  These limitations take several forms such 
as curfews, checkpoints, emergency zones, even the jurisdiction of trails.  The people of Peru 
endured all these and this hastened Sendero’s downfall.  The government can increase these 





reach a ‘breaking point’ at which they reject the government and swing to the insurgency.  This 
breaking point is much higher in underdeveloped nations because the people are accustomed to 
hardship and little freedom to begin with.  For example, people in the United States complain 
about minor air travel restrictions, whereas the Peruvians endured almost total restrictions on 
movement, rights to assemble, rights to due process, and even rights to live where they wanted 
and many more without complaint.   
  The second component of the government effort was to develop intelligence information 
and target the leadership and cohesion of Sendero Luminoso, as demonstrated by the Fujimori 
administration during the 1990’s.  President Fujimori used Vladimiro Montesinos to create an 
effective, imposing intelligence network throughout Peru.  He also used his decree power to 
remove restrictions on intelligence collection to allow the intelligence network to observe all 
aspects of Peruvian life.  This all-encompassing intelligence effort allowed the Fujimori 
administration to locate and capture hundreds of Sendero leaders, including Abimael Guzmán.  
The military and police also used torture and violence to gain information on Sendero leaders, 
especially during the Belaúnde administration.  It is safe to say that a large percentage of 
captured Senderistas underwent torture during interrogation.  Those harsh methods did produce 
results, leading to the capture of other rebel leaders, but undoubtedly many innocent people were 
wrongly persecuted.  Additionally, the amnesty program offered by successive administrations 
was an effective method of bringing in many Senderistas including the leaders.  By the mid to 
late 1990’s, many insurgents turned themselves in to avoid capture or death.  These same 






 The military counterguerrilla campaign also contributed to Sendero’s defeat.  The Dirty 
War launched by the Belaúnde administration in 1982 was a violent, uncontrolled effort.  The 
military was not prepared to conduct small-unit actions in the highlands because they were 
trained for a conventional war against Peru’s neighbors including Ecuador and Chile.  It took the 
military roughly three years to develop more effective counterguerrilla techniques to defeat 
Sendero Luminoso tactically.  One of the military’s most effective techniques was the 
counterguerrilla bases it established near key towns and infrastructure.  The units operating out 
of these bases severely restricted Sendero’s ability to conduct attacks.  The military also enjoyed 
superior firepower over Sendero throughout the war.  In addition to the counterguerrilla bases, 
the military effectively used the local civil defense patrols or rondas campesinos.  The rondas 
campesinos provided security for some of the smaller villages and more importantly, provided 
intelligence information on Sendero movements.  The biggest benefit from the rondas was that it 
involved the peasants in the counterinsurgency rather than in the insurgency.   
   Sendero Luminoso never achieved Guzmán’s goal of a general peasant uprising that 
surrounded the cities and caused the government to fail.  The insurgency achieved a Phase III 
insurgency only a couple of times when large formations attacked and occupied territory in the 
Upper Huallaga Valley.  The rest of the time Sendero oscillated between Phase I and Phase II.  
The majority of the peasants never shared Guzmán’s vision.  They initially supported Sendero 
Luminoso because Sendero provided services that the government never provided.  When 
Sendero stopped providing these services to the people, their support waned.  The peasants 
wanted benefits such as clean water, reliable electricity, and help to grow their crops, not the 





 The lack of outside support also hampered Sendero.  Most successful insurgencies 
succeeded through some external support.  Yet Sendero intentionally chose to reject this outside 
help.  Only after the movement was serious decline did its leaders begin to carry its message 
abroad in a futile attempt to garner significant support.   
 Sendero Luminoso was associated with Mao Zedong because it attempted to create a 
peasant uprising in Peru.  But Sendero did not strictly adhere to Mao’s doctrine.  He stated that in 
order for guerrillas to be successful, the insurgency must have powerful political leaders who 
“must work with the people.”1  By working with the people, Sendero would have continued to 
receive support.  But Sendero did not work with the people once the government sent forces in 
against it.  From that point onward, Sendero focused on destroying anything not Sendero.  The 
group no longer assisted the peasants but coerced and threatened them and, as a result, their 
support ceased.  As Mao stated, the guerrillas derive their existence and support from the people 
and must attempt to meet the needs of the people or the insurgency will fail.2   
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